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Divided by Common Language:
'Capture' Theories in GATT/WTO and
the Communicative Impasse
By DONGSHENG ZANG*
The most recent bad news from the World Trade Organization
(WTO) concerned the breakdown of negotiations during the
summer of 2008.1 The breakdown occurred because India and
China, on the one side, and the European Union and the United
States, on the other, could not reach a compromise on agricultural
policy.2 The Washington Post commented that the breakdown of
talks was due to "the reluctance of emerging juggernauts such as
India and China to risk their newfound success by offering rich
nations greater access to the hundreds of millions of consumers
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1. See Stephen Castle & Mark Landler, After 7 Years, Talks on Trade Collapse,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2008, at Al ("The failure appeared to end, for the near term at
least, any hopes of a global deal to further open markets, cut farm subsidies and
strengthen the international trading system.").
2. See Anthony Faiola & Rama Lakshmi, Trade Talks Crumble in Feud over Farm
Aid, WASH. PosT, July 30, 2008, at Al.
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rising out of poverty in the developing world." 3 The Washington
Post described this reluctance as "what is likely to be the biggest
challenge in coming years to expanding world trade." 4 In India, an
opposite view was articulated in an editorial of the Mumbai-based
Economic & Political Weekly. 5 The editorial argued that all the parties
to the talks were pressed "to suit the interests of the powerful
commodity lobbies on Capitol Hill in Washington." 6 Particularly,
the editorial asserted, it was the U.S. cotton subsidy that blocked
negotiations at the Doha Round. The implicit message was that the
WTO is largely a tool controlled by the U.S. agricultural lobby.
Kamal Nath, India's chief negotiator, Minister of Commerce and
Industries, and an aggressive free-market advocate at home, was
hailed as a national hero for his unyielding position during the trade
talks. 7
This breakdown reminded people of earlier ones: Seattle in
1999, Doha in 2001, Cancun in 2003, and Hong Kong in 2006. In the
past, the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), had a number of occasions in which
their efficacy was challenged, yet they were able to survive.8 This
time, however, the WTO has not made a single forward move in
nearly a decade. 9 The impasse continues after the July collapse: in
December 2008, the WTO's latest Draft Modalities Texts show little
progress. 10 The WTO member countries are divided into two camps
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Editorial, End of the "Development" Round, ECON. & POL. WKLY. (Mumbai),
Aug. 9, 2008, at 5.
6. Id.
7. Rama Lakshmi, Hard Line at WTO Earns Indian Praise, WASH. POST, Aug. 1,
2008, at A12. The Washington Post report noted: "Two years ago, he launched the
biggest industrial expansion program in post-independence India by approving 250
projects aimed at creating Chinese-style special economic zones on Indian
farmland. He pushed ahead despite an uproar in Parliament and countless street
protests by farmers." Id.
8. E.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Multilateralism at Risk: The GATT is Dead, Long Live
GATT, 13 WORLD ECON. 149 (1990). Professor Bhagwati's article was partly in
response to Lester Thurow, who announced in 1988 Davos Symposium that GATT
was dead.
9. The Doha Round... and Round... and Round, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2008,
at 37.
10. The WTO's latest Draft Modalities Texts include two key documents: (a)
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- the developing countries and the developed countries - which
cannot agree on fundamental terms of trade liberalization."
In
order to understand the stalemates, this article evaluates a key
conceptual framework in the trade talks: the "capture" theories. By
using the term "lobby," the Indian editorial implied that the
position of the U.S. was nothing more than what the "special
interests" of the cotton industry dictated. The basic claim of
"capture" theory is that the regulated - the cotton industry - has
"captured" the regulator - the U.S. trade officials. Increasingly, the
word "capture" is almost inter-changeable with protectionism,
because the former explains the latter. As "capture" theory is
widely used in the discourse on trade policy, it has become a
common language. Ironically, it has not functioned to channel
communication; rather it is more often invoked to justify a pre12
existing position.
This is not merely a matter of dialogue between the developed
and developing countries in the WTO. A brief review of the history
of the WTO shows that "capture" theory actually set the theoretical
foundation of the institutional design of the WTO.13 Its different
elements originated from a school of economics called "publicchoice" in the United States, and Ordo-liberal economics in

World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised
Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 (Dec. 6, 2008), and (b) World
Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Fourth Revision of Draft
Modalities for Non-Agricultural Market Access, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 (Dec. 6,
2008),
both
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsO8_e/ag-nama dec08_ e.htm (last
visited on Mar. 18, 2009). Professor Raj Bhala recently commented that, "[in
virtually all material respects, the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities
Agreement proved to be the same as its predecessor of July 2008." Raj Bhala,
Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45 TEXAS
INT'L L.J. (Oct. 2009) (forthcoming).
11. The dichotomy between the developed and developing countries is, of
course, more ambiguous than it appears to be. The term "developing countries" is
not defined in the WTO Agreements; rather, it is self-designated. Switzerland, for
example, has raised the "graduation" issues for some of the bigger developing
countries but has not succeeded.
Seung Wha Chang, WTO for Trade and
Development Post-Doha, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc LAW 119
(William J. Davey & John Jackson eds., 2008).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 226 and 227.
13. See generally infra Part II.
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Europe. 14 By the late 1970s to mid 1980s, the notion of "capture"
spread to trade economists' and GATT lawyers' analyses of
protectionism. As an analytic tool, "capture" became the common
language among the GATT's major intellectual architects: Jan
Tumlir, John H. Jackson, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. 15 The
formation of the WTO, for these intellectual architects, was a
transformation of GATT into a "public institution." In other words,
the WTO was not only based upon the analytic power of "capture"
theories, but also upon the ambition to escape from its own logic.
Today, two major sociopolitical forces, which share the
vocabulary of "capture," challenge the supposed triumph of the
WTO. First, is resistance from social activist groups - environment
groups, human rights groups, public health groups, labor unions based in the developed world. This resistance started in the early
1990s as an intellectual movement in the debates over GATT/WTO,
NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement), and the European
Union ("EU"). The 1999 Seattle debacle indicates that at the turn of
the century, resistance from these social activists groups had become
a broad sociopolitical movement. 16 Deeply rooted in this critique of
the WTO is a "capture" theory. Under this line of reasoning, to
expose the WTO as an agent of global capitalism is the same as
revealing its "democratic deficit," or vice versa.17 The second
sociopolitical force is resistance based in the Third World.
Specifically, resistance from social groups, trade officials working in
the governments of the developing countries, and intellectuals who
are either based in or associated with developing countries. I will
call this the "Third World Resistance." A key difference between
these two sociopolitical forces is that the Third World Resistance
does not have an anti-free-trade "bias." On the contrary, trade
officials of the Third World embrace free-trade policy, and their
critique of the WTO is that the latter does not live up to the promises

14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II, §§ A, B, C.
16. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
17. Robert Howse, How to Begin to Think About the 'Democratic Deficit' at the
WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS:
NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 79-101 (Stefan Griller ed.,
2003).
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of free-trade, it is rather "captured" by protectionism.
This article focuses on the Third World Resistance. It organizes
arguments made from the Third World perspectives into three
groups: (1) the Third World Approach to International Law
("TWAIL"), which follows a Marxian tradition in the critique of
global dominance by the West; 18 (2) arguments made by the
developing countries' trade officials, based on their experiences in
the WTO negotiation processes; 19 and (3) critiques of the WTO from
a growing network of development economists associated with
projects sponsored by the World Bank.20 All three arguments share
the logic of "capture" though they are based on different
presumptions and policy-preferences.
The exchange between the Mumbai journal and the Washington
Post is not incidental. It represents the positions of both sides and
the parlance employed in many trade negotiations even before 1999
Seattle. From the viewpoint of communication theory, 21 the WTO
today can be characterized as a community divided by this common
This article examines the details of the "capture"
language.
arguments in order to understand the communicative impasse. It
starts with a distinction of two different elements of any "capture"
theory: the descriptive and prescriptive. The descriptive element is
an analytic tool to detect the gap between goals proclaimed and
what is achieved in reality, while the prescriptive element always,
explicitly or implicitly, is premised on the possible point of
departure. It is often assumed that the prescription is a logical
inference from the description. This article argues against this
assumption and instead claims a logical indeterminacy between the

18. See infra Part III, § A.
19. See infra Part III, § B.
20. See infra Part III, § C.
21. I draw ideas from a wide range of theories in language philosophy linked
with or based upon the late Wittgenstein: LUDWIG WrITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001) (1953); J. L. AUSTIN, How TO
Do THINGS WITH WORDS a. 0. Urmson & Marina SbisA eds., 2d ed. 1975) (1962);
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Cumming & Donald G. Marshall
trans., 1989) (1960); JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1984) (1981); JORGEN HABERMAS, ON THE PRAGMATICS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION:
PRELIMINARY STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Barbara Fultner

trans., 2001) (1984).
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descriptive and prescriptive parts of "capture" theories. 22 The
reason can be very philosophical, but can also be obvious: at a
certain point the "capture" claim must decide where to stop, so that
its prescriptive part can start. However, the crucial questions where "capture" stops and what to do in response to "capture" - are
not decided by logic of the "capture" claim itself. This article first
aims to demonstrate the indeterminacy by looking into the historical
and contemporary "capture" arguments.
Then it will use
indeterminacy to explain the communicative impasse we are facing
today - in other words, to explain how we are divided by the
common language of "capture." As a critique of the WTO today,
this article argues that the WTO orthodox "capture" theorists are
unwilling to direct the analytic power of the argument at the WTO
itself. The Third World Resistance presents a decisively fatal
challenge for the WTO orthodox "capture" theorists: if they choose
to continue their logical "rigor," there is no reason that the same
logic cannot apply to the WTO itself. Thus, they should welcome
the critiques and call for reform of the WTO. Or, if they choose their
policy preference by brushing aside the challenges, then they must
admit their "capture" claims offer no theoretical foundation for the
WTO, making the WTO the logical antimony of their initial
"capture" theories.
This article is divided into four parts. Part I presents the origins
of "capture" theories in economics during the 1940s in Europe and
1960s in the United States.
It aims to provide background
information for Part II, which presents a short genealogy of the
"capture" theories among leading trade economists and lawyers in
the context of GATT. It also includes two official GATT reports: the
Leutwiler Report (1985) and the Long Report (1989). The purpose is
to show how "capture" theory was behind major institutional
reform proposals in the wake of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
22. The notion of indeterminacy comes from Roberto M. Unger and Dani
Rodrik in their recent works on trade policy. See ROBERTO M. UNGER, FREE TRADE
REIMAGINED: THE WORLD DISION OF LABOR AND THE METHOD OF ECONOMIcS 28-36
(2007); DANi RODRIK, ONE ECONOMICS, MANY RECIPES: GLOBALIZATION, INSTITUrIONS,
AND ECONOMIC GROwTH 29 (2007); Dani Rodrik, What Does the Political Economy
Literatureon Trade Policy (not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 4870, 1994).
In legal theory, the notion of
indeterminacy comes from the Critical Legal Studies movement, see DUNCAN
KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, (FIN DE SIECLE) (1997); Roberto M. Unger, The
CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983).
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Finally, Part III explores "capture" theory from the developing
countries' point of view, mainly based on discussions of India. Part
IV concludes the article.
I. "Capture" Theories and Indeterminacy
"Capture" as a critique of government has a long and rich
history. Thorstein Veblen, one of the greatest economists in
American history, argued in 1904 that "[riepresentative government
means, chiefly, representation of business interests.
The
government commonly works in the interests of business men with
a fairly consistent singleness of purpose." 23 J. A. Hobson, the radical
English journalist and economist who inspired Keynes, linked Great
Britain's colonial policy in South Africa to the capture of
government by financiers at home. 24 Here we will discuss only two
schools of thought: one is the Ordo-liberal economics of the interwar
period in Europe; the other is the public-choice theory of the 1960s
United States.
A. Interwar Period
The Ordo-liberal economic school included Walter Eucken,
Franz Bohm, and Wilhelm Rbpke, 25 who themselves inherited ideas
from an earlier generation of Austrian economists. 26 Eucken and

23. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 286 (1904).

24. J. A. Hobson, Capitalism and Imperialism in South Africa, 77 CONTEMP. REV. 15
(1900), reprinted in I. A. HOBSON, WRITINGS ON IMPERIALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM
(Peter Cain ed., 1992). ("The driving forces of aggressive Imperialism are the
organized influences of certain professional and commercial classes which have
certain definite economic advantage to gain by assuming this pseudo-patriotic
cloak. The most potent of all these influences, the power behind the throne in every
modem civilized country, is the financier .... ).
25. RAZEEN SALLY, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:

STUDIES IN THEORY AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 131-50 (1998) (discussing Wilhelm

Ropke) [hereinafter SALLY]; see also generally, Razeen Sally, Comment, Wilhelm Ropke
and InternationalEconomic Order: "Liberalismfrom Below," 50 ORDO: JAHRBUCH FOR DIE
ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 47 (1999).
26. These earlier generation Austrian economists include: Carl Menger (18401921), Philip H. Wicksteed (1844-1927), Friedrich von Wieser (1851-1926), Knut
Wicksell (1851-1926), and William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882). See AUSTRIAN
ECONOMICS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND (Wolfgang Grassl &

Barry Smith eds., 1986); 4 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FORTUNES OF ECONOMIC
THINKING: ESSAYS ON AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS AND THE IDEAL OF FREEDOM, in THE
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Ropke clearly understood pressure groups and blamed them for
undermining the competition policy during the interwar period. In
1940, Eucken published The Foundations of Economics (1940), his
magnum opus. Eucken warned economists not to underestimate the
danger of monopoly, because "[b]y doing so they not only retreat
from the facts of the real economic world, but at the same time they
are involuntarily serving the interests of particular private pressuregroups." 27 Thus, for Eucken, an essential task of the "economic
constitutions," under either national or international law, was to
combat vested interests. 28 Wilhelm Ropke, in InternationalEconomic
Disintegration (1942), considered "the exploitation of ideologies by
strong sectional interests" as a problem "of the widest scope and the
greatest importance." 29 One example of this problem was the
growing agricultural protectionism in Europe. 30 Ropke was close to
making a "capture" claim when he stated: "recent increase of
agricultural nationalism must be understood, if not excused, as the
agricultural counterpart of the general development of our
economic system towards more intervention, planning, monopoly,
and rigidity." 31 In another work, International Order and Economic
Integration (1945), Ropke commented,
If protective tariffs fixed by the long term commercial agreements
were the heart of the earlier trade policy and served the relatively
modest goal of protection and the promotion of individual
economic branches, the new commercial policy is becoming more
and more an instrument of a complete screening of the whole
national economy which is rigid with and dominated by
32
monopoly and interventionism.
Liberals used similar logical structures to claim "capture" for
the purpose of advocating policies they preferred. J. A. Hobson and

(Peter G. Klein ed., 1992).
27. WALTER EUCKEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS: HISTORY AND THEORY IN
THE ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC REALITY 146 (T. W. Hutchinson trans., University of
Chicago Press 1951) (1940).
COLLECTED WORKS OF F. A. HAYEK

28. Id. at 305-06, 315-16.
29. WILHELM ROPKE, INTERNATIONAL
1950) (1942).

ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION

30. Id. at 111-61.
31. Id. at 134.
32. WILHELM ROPKE, INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND ECONOMIC
(Gwen E. Trinks, Joyce Taylor & Cicely Kiufer trans.) (1945).

92

(Macmillan

INTEGRATION

161
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Veblen are earlier examples, but the best example during the
interwar period is Elmer E. Schattschneider (1892-1971). In his
book, Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff (1935),33 Schattschneider
employed the concept of "pressure politics" in his analysis of the
American tariffs. Schattschneider not only echoed Veblen and
Hobson, but also pushed "capture" theory to a different level by
providing great details of pressure groups, Congress, and the
interactions between them in the making of tariff legislations in the
United States. He observed that "[i]f the overlords of business are
not masters of the state, they seem at least to negotiate with it as
equals," 34 and thus the "function of pressure politics is to reconcile
formal political democracy and economic autocracy." 35 This is a
classic statement of "capture." Schattschneider even went on to
explain what led to this situation:
Unsupervised conduct in pressure politics means that the few will
control the process at the expense of the many. The inertia of the
masses is so great that not even the strong incitements of
economic interest arouse them, especially if they are affected
obliquely and indirectly. Selectivity is the basis of pressure
politics. If all interests and all groups were equally active,
pressure politics would be futile. The assumption is that a few can
exert great influence on the process of government because they
are organized and because they are alert and have access to
information, know what they want, and have power in the
economic regime the formal organization of government, while
36
the mass remain inert.
After World War II, Schattschneider's analytic framework
became not merely influential; instead he "set the tone for a whole
generation of political writing on pressure groups." 37 In 1953-54, he
became Vice-President of the American Political Science
Association, and the President in 1956-57.
However,
Schattschneider's "capture" theory was not a nihilist argument. As

33. See generally E. E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES, AND THE TARIFF: A
STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS, AS SHOWN IN THE 1929-1930
REVISION OF THE TARIFF (1935).

34. Id. at 287.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. RAYMOND BAUER, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL & LEWIS A. DEXTER, AMERIcAN
BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE 25 (2d ed. 1972) (1963).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 32:2

a liberal supporter of the New Deal, Schattschneider not only
believed in public interest, but also suggested that pressures from
interest groups could be counterbalanced by organized social
groups: "[p]ressures are formidable and overwhelming only when
they have become unbalanced and one-sided. As long as opposed
forces are equal or nearly equal, governments can play off one
against the other." 38
"Capture" theory was popular enough to enter into the official
lexicon of the League of Nations during the interwar period. In 1942,
the League's Economic, Financial and Transit Department, which
was in charge of coordinating commercial policy among member
countries, issued a report Commercial Policy in the Interwar Period
(1942), which stated:
In regard to policy, sectional pressures rather than impartial
judgment, sectional interests rather than the public interest were
too often paramount. Policy was misdirected as a result of such
pressures, as a result of the immediate impact of a persistent
series of external events.., and as a result of the inescapable
ignorance of the form that economic forces... which only slowly
revealed themselves, would take." 39
Intellectually, the Ordo-liberal views became important in the
Anglo-American academic context through the association of
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek who immigrated to the
U.S. after World War II. In addition, Jan Tumlir, a Czech native who
studied in Germany before moving to the U.S., was very impressed
by Walter Eucken's The Foundations of Economics.40 The Ordo-liberal
views joined the interwar Chicago school economics leaders like
Jacob Viner and Frank Knight to become the main critics of GATT
when the International Trade Organization ("ITO") negotiation was
concluded. 41 This critique was revitalized by Tumlir in 1977, when
he made a proposal to the Trade Policy Research Centre to translate
some of their works and make them more accessible to the general
38. E. E. SCHATrsCHNEIDER, supra note 33, at 288.
39. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, COMMERCIAL POLICY

IN

THE

INTERWAR

PERIOD:

INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS AND NATIONAL POLICIES 154 (League of Nations ed.,

1942) (emphasis added).
40. SALLY, supra note 25, at 153-73 (discussing Jan Tumlir).
41. The best example is Viner's critical comment on the ITO Charter, see, Jacob

Viner, Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter (1947), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 351-66 (1951).
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public in the English-speaking world. 42 Tumlir sought to revitalize
Ordo-liberalism because he saw a close connection between the
disintegration of international economic order in the 1930s and that
43
of the 1960s.
B. The Deregulation Era of 1960s
Public-choice theory was started in the late 1950s and 1960s by
a group of economists interested in applying Ordo-liberal doctrines
to the study of political processes, such as public finance, voting,
and lawmaking.44 They claimed that the choices made as the result
of the public process were anything but social or collective
rationality. Rather, the theory asserted, "public choice" was an
oxymoron because the process was no different from the market in
which countless individuals engage in endless bargaining based on
the calculation of their own interests. In the political market, all
collective entities must be disaggregated into individuals because
only individuals have ends and make decisions. 45 Thus, under this
42. Hans Willgerodt & Alan Peacock, German Liberalism and Economic Revival, in
GERMANY'S SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 1 (Alan Peacock &

Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989) (discussing Jan Tumlir's relationship with the German
Ordo-liberal school). The book was published in memory of Jan Tumlir.
43. Jan Tumlir, Evolution of the Concept of InternationalEconomic Order 1914-1980,
in CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF ECONOMIC POLICY 152-82 (Frances Cairncross ed.,
1981). Razeen Sally saw the intellectual connection when he commented that, "[n ] o
one has come as tantalizingly close as Tumlir to making the twentieth-century
statement on classical liberalism and international economic order." SALLY, supra
note 25, at 153.
44. It was composed of three branches: the Virginia school represented by
James M. Buchanan, the Chicago school by George J. Stigler, and lastly, the group
theory by Mancur Olson. See James M. Buchanan, An Economist's Approach to
"Scientific Politics" (1968), reprinted in POLITICS AS PUBLIC CHOICE 3-14 (Robert D.
Tollison ed., 2001, vol.13 of Collected Works of James M. Buchanan); see also generally
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed.
1971) (1965); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION
(1975); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1969);
Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969);
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 335
JAMES BUCHANAN

(1974); William A. Jordan, ProducerProtection, PriorMarket Structure and the Effects of
Government Regulation, 15 J. L. & ECON. 151 (1972).
45. This is articulated in the philosophical doctrine of public choice theory as
"methodological individualism." See James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of
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line of thinking, a lawmaker would only vote for the purpose of
getting re-elected, a bureaucrat would only make decisions for rentseeking.
Having deconstructed collective entity and "public
interest," public-choice theory moved to "capture" theory:
ultimately, "public choice" is necessarily more controlled by
organized interests because the more general interest is spread
across society and those individuals (such as consumers) face a "free
rider" problem. Thus, a lawmaker is necessarily more influenced by
business, a regulator is more often "captured" by the regulated,
because the latter is always better organized. Is there any way out?
The short answer was deregulation. From the 1970s, public-choice
gained more power and eventually led a deregulation movement in
the United States and Great Britain under the Reagan-Thatcher
"revolution."46

For the liberals, public-choice theory was a violent political
attack on the welfare state programs, 47 based on a problematic
Economic Policy, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 243, 244 (1987); James M. Buchanan, Nobel Price
in Economics Acceptance Speech (Dec. 8, 1986) (discussing the "methodological
individualism"); see also generally James M. Buchanan, The Soul of Classical Liberalism,
55 SwIss REV. INT'L ECON. REL. 7 (2000).
46. Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory
of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984). Capture theories also had a significant
impact on judicial review in the United States: see generally Thomas W. Merrill,
Capture Theory and the Courts, 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1039 (1997); Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873
(1987).
47. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RE-CONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 71 (1990).
For Cass R. Sunstein, the public-choice theory
assumes away the existence of active citizenry in a republic and thus denies
legitimacy of any political discourse and genuine critique:
[t]he notion of rent-seeking rejects, as unproductive, nearly all of the basic
workings of politics. It treats citizenship itself as an evil. Efforts to enact
public aspirations, to counteract discrimination, to protect the environment
- all these are seen as the diversion of productive energies into a wasteful
place. This view represents a peculiar reversal of the liberal tradition,
which has seen political behavior not as an evil, but as an important arena
for education, for deliberation and discussion about the nation's direction,
for the development of the faculties, and for the cultivation of aspirations
and feelings of altruism.
See also, Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing:A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
'Empirical' Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP

(1991).
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assumption of "economic man." 48 But it doesn't follow that liberals
did not take advantage of "capture" theory's power in polemics.
Among the contemporaries of the public-choice theorists, Theodore
J. Lowi followed the liberal tradition of Schattschneider. 49 Lowi, a
believer of the New Deal liberalism,5 0 launched a general attack on
the "New Welfare" policies of the 1960s, which for him had become
"a systematic expression of interest-group liberalism." 51 Lowi found
agriculture as the best example showing "private expropriation of
public authority."5 2 Like Schattschneider, Lowi's overall goal was to
re-design the welfare state by improving democratic participation of
the general public, not by withdrawing the State and acceding to the
market. 53 Thus, Lowi's "capture" polemics was not premised on an
indiscriminate denial of public interests.
Regardless of one's political position, "capture" is often a
powerful tool in rhetoric - it is an alarming message, a sign of
danger and deception. Its power lies in the contrast between
"special interest" and the presumed public interest;5 4 its weakness,

48. Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundation of

Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977); AMARTYA
Choice, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 65-118 (2002).

SEN,

The Possibilityof Social

49. THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969).

50. Id. at 217-26 (discussing the 1935 welfare programs).
51. Id. at 233.
52. Id. at 102. This was a view shared by a lot of the critics in the field of
agriculture policy. See, e.g., GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1967).
53. Theodore J. Lowi, Europeanization of America? From United States to United
State, NATIONALIZING GOVERNMENT: PUBLIC POLICIES IN AMERICA 15 (Theodore J.
Lowi & Alan Stone eds., 1978); Theodore J. Lowi, The Welfare State, the New
Regulation and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 17-58
(Allan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
54. "Its value is therefore not determined merely by that concept or meaning
for which it is a token. It must also be assessed against comparable values, by
contrast with other words. The content of a word is determined in the final
analysis not by what it contains but by what exists outside it." FERDINAND DE
SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 114 (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye
On Saussure's contribution to linguistic
eds., Roy Harris trans., 1959).
structructuralism see RoY HARRIS, LANGUAGE, SAUSSURE AND WITTGENSTEIN: How TO
PLAY GAMES WITH WORDS (1988); see also RoY HARRIS & TALBOT J. TAYLOR, Saussure on
Language and Thought, in LANDMARKS IN LINGUISTIC THOUGHT: THE WESTERN
TRADITION FROM SOCRATES TO SAUSSURE 176-90 (1989); TERRY EAGLETON, Structuralism
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however, is that the ontological discussion of "interests" is missing:
How do we define "special interest?" Where do we cut the line
between public and private interest? The popular but often loose
employment of the key notion "interest" often makes the theories
dependent on them a tautology. 55 Public-choice theory does not
provide any guidance on this crucial question. It presumed a notion
of interest and then focused itself on the process of bargaining. A
debate between the young Richard Posner and George Stigler is
illuminating. In the early 1970s, Posner expressed some skepticism
of Stigler's "capture" claim. Stigler's theory, Posner reasoned, once
"pushed to its logical extreme, becomes rather incredible, because it
excludes the possibility that a society concerned with the ability of
interest groups to manipulate the political process in their favor
might establish institutions that enabled genuine public interest
considerations to influence the formation of policy." 56 Posner felt
this could lead to a fundamental challenge to the idea of market
itself - which he considered a public good: "[m]ore generally, the
many features of law and public policy designed to maintain a
market system are more plausibly explained by reference to a broad
social interest in efficiency than by reference to the designs of
narrow interest groups."5 7 In response, Stigler clarified that this did
not mean industry gets all, "it is not correct to say that a producer
group - even the most powerful group - gets all that it might wish
from the political process." Rather, "[t]he political process, like the
economic process, finds intermediate positions which reflect the
equilibrium of diverse forces." 58
In this internal dialogue, Posner asked an ontological question
of interest since he felt Stigler's was too narrow; however, Stigler
evaded the challenge completely by referring to the process of
bargaining. And he was not alone. James Buchanan and Gordon
Tullock expressed something similar in The Calculus of Consent
(1962) when they tried to answer the question: is constitutional
change possible? Their answer:
Ultimately the hope for some "improvement" must lie in the
and Semiotics, in LITERARY THEORY:

AN INTRODUCTION

79-109 (2d ed. 1996).

55. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, The Concept of Interest: From Euphemism to Tautology,
in RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 35-55 (1986).
56. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, supra note 44, at 349-50.
57. Id. at 350.
58. STIGLER, supra note 44, at 138.
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mutual consent of the special interests themselves for
constitutional changes which will act so as to reduce the excessive
costs that discriminatory legislation imposes on all groups over
time. It is in seeking such changes in the organizational rules
themselves that genuinely enlightened self-interests of these
59
groups may be expressed.
Therefore, the strength of the "capture" claim in public choice
theory only lies in its formal/logical structure - the relationship
between public and private interest. But because public-choice
theorists refuse to define exactly what public and private interests
are, the logical structure was built on a sliding scale. "Capture" per
se, as a logical form, does not provide any determinate guidance in
identifying the substantive issue. 60 Thus, it is not surprising that
alternatives proposed by "capture" theorists both in the
conservative and the liberal-camp, such as "rule of law," or
constitutionalization, tend to be formalistic in logic but opentextured in substance. 61 This is also why during the interwar period,
"capture" was argued by both the liberals and conservatives in
Europe.
The disconnection between form and substance has two
consequences. First, a "capture" claim itself does not tell the theorist
where to stop. In earlier examples, both Stigler and Buchanan used
"equilibrium" to suggest vaguely that there would be a point on
which a balance among different interests - a balance which might
be between the private interests and the public good - can be
achieved.
Again, the "equilibrium" is more a logical/formal
relationship.
Both Stigler and Buchanan refused to explain
"equilibrium" in substantive terms. Similarly, Lowi's alternative 62
the "judicial democracy" - is more formal-logical than substantive.
59.

JAMES BUCHANAN

& GORDON

TULLOCK,

supra note 44, at 290.

60. In legal adjudication, form is more often used to disguise choice made in
substance, see, Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991, No.1).

61. Elsewhere, I have analyzed the relationship between this theoretical
foundation and the textualist approach in the jurisprudence of GATT/WTO
dispute settlement process see Dongsheng Zang, Textualism in GATT/WTO
Jurisprudence:Lessons for the ConstitutionalizationDebate, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &

COM. 393 (2006).
62. Robert C. Grady, Juridical Democracy & Democratic Values: An Evaluation of
Lowi's Alternative to Interest Group Liberalism, 16 POLITY 404-22 (1984).
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The second indeterminacy is that the "capture" claim does not
provide any guidance on the question of the proper response to
"capture." In general, public-choice economists were in favor of
deregulation, while the liberals were in favor of smart regulation or
re-regulation. But neither position was derived from "capture"
itself. The conservative orientation of the public-choice economists
came not from public-choice's own logical structure, but from
policy-preferences held prior to its logic. In other words, a claim of
"capture," by itself, did not have determinate implication in policy
prescription. On the contrary, that determinacy, if presumed, must
be questioned.
II. 'Capture' Theories and GATT
During the 1980s, Ordo-liberal and public-choice economics
gained influence among trade economists and international lawyers
associated with GATT, and "capture" theory became the common
language. For example, in the 1980s Jagdish Bhagwati, who was to
serve as Economic Policy Advisor to the Director-General of GATT
from 1991 to 1993, began to study tariff making, tariff evasion, and
revenue seeking. 63 In 1987, Bhagwati, delivered his Ohlin Lectures
in Stockholm, 64 where he elaborated on the view that antidumping
and countervailing duties in America were mainly for the benefit of
the industries unwilling to face competition from abroad - a typical
application of the capture theory in public-choice economics. 65 This
approach can be seen from works of three scholars who played a
key role in shaping GATT and pushing forward the WTO: Jan
Tumlir, John Jackson, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. The official
embrace of the economic theories is analyzed in two GATT reports,
the Leutwiler Report (1985) and the Long Report (1989).

63. See Jagdish N. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, Revenue Seeking: A Generalization
of the Theory of Tariffs, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1069-87 (Dec. 1980,); Jagdish N. Bhagwati &
T. N. Srinivasan, Comment, Revenue Seeking: A Generalizationof the Theory of Tariffs a Correction,90 J. POL. ECON. 188 (1982).
64. JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988) (based upon Ohlin Lecturers
delivered by the author at the Stockholm School of Economics in Oct. 1987).
65. David Palmeter, Book Review, The Capture of the Antidumping Law, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 182 (1989) (reviewing JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM, supra note 66);
see also Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionismas a 'Safeguard':A Positive Analysis of the GATT
'Escape Clause' with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991) [hereinafter
Sykes Protectionismas a 'Safeguard].
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A. The 'Resident Philosopher'in GAIT: Jan Tumlir
Jan Tumlir was the Director of Economic Research and Analysis
Division at GATT from 1967 to 1985.66 Tumlir established his
reputation as "resident philosopher" of GATT in the 1970s and early
1980s. Throughout his tenure at GATT, Tumlir led and influenced a
group of economists, including Richard Blackhurst, who joined
Tumlir's Division in 1974 and became his successor in 1985, and
Gary Banks, who served in Tumlir's Division as a senior economist
from 1976 to 1984. These men became his intellectual disciples in
the fight against protectionism by GATT member countries. 67
Tumlir and his associates also set up a Trade Policy Research Centre
in London, which was led by Hugh Corbet. Corbet was also the
Managing Editor of a journal called The World Economy, where
Tumlir served on the board. 68
Like his mentors during the interwar period, Tumlir was
deeply disturbed by what he perceived the disintegration of the
international economic order after the Tokyo Round negotiations. 69
Tumlir saw the welfare state as the main reason for the crises: state
regulation and control, including foreign trade, infringed on the
private property rights and distorted the market, which
66. Jan Tumlir, The New Protectionism, Cartels, and the International Order, in
239-58 (1979), infra note
201.
67. E.g., JAN TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES
CHALLENGES TO A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

(1985) [hereinafter TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM]; RICHARD BLACKi-HURST, NICOLAS MARIAN
& JAN TUMLIR, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PROTECTIONISM, AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1977);
GARY BANKS & JAN TUMLIR, ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE ADJUSTMENT PROBLEM (1986);

Robert E. Hudec, The Role of Judicial Review in PreservingLiberal Foreign Trade Policies,
in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 503-18 (Meinhard

Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1992) (a detailed review of Jan Tumlir's ideas
on protectionism as a constitutionalism failure).
68. HUGH CORBET, TOWARDS AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY: REPORT BY AN ADVISORY

GROUP (1972).

69. Tumlir noted that the international economic order "was highly successful
for two decades," but "[alt the beginning of the 1980s, however, the order is in an
advanced state of disintegration." Jan Tumlir, International Economic Order and
Democratic Constitutionalism,34 ORDO: JAHRBUCH FOR DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFr
UND GESELLSCHAFT 71, 74 (1983). Tumlir made similar warnings before the Tokyo
Round as well. See Jan Tumlir, Can the International Economic Order be Saved? 1
WORLD ECON. 3 (1977). "The reform of the international order is deteriorating into
'permanent crisis management' or, at best, 'management of interdependence', as
fashionable parlance has it." Id. at 3.
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subsequently caused tensions in international relations. For Tumlir,
state control and regulation were inherently problematic, because
the regulators were "captured" by the interest groups and, as a
consequence, people often misconceived sovereignty and national
interest. 70 In his book, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic
Societies (1985), Tumlir contended that, "[w]hat government[s]
invoke as 'national interest' are merely the substantive interests of
the groups composing the majority coalition - sectional and
therefore impermanent interests, changing in the short run with the
succession of democratic governments and in the long run with the
change in social and economic structures." 71 This confusion of
genuine national interest with the short-run, undemocratic special
interests explained the confusion of genuine international
negotiation with the bargaining of tariffs by national governments,
causing the disintegration of the international economic order.72
The concern went beyond economic efficiency and included
issues in legal theory. Like Buchanan, who attributed budget deficit
in the 1970s and 1980s to the "constitutional failure" in constraining
the bureaucracy, 73 Tumlir also regarded protectionism in trade
policy as a constitutional failure. Why did democratic institutions
not scrutinize regulators' discretion? The problem lay in broad
delegation of legislative power. 74 In 1984, Tumlir questioned the
constitutional legitimacy of delegation of legislative power to the

70. Jan Tumlir, National Sovereignty, Power and Interest, 31 ORDO: JAHRBUCH FIR
(1980).
71. TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM, supra note 67, at 58.
72. "When substantive sectional interests are mistaken for national ones,
however, it is impossible for the settlements of successive conflicts to remain
mutually consistent. Eventually the framework of rules within which conflicts
could be settled routinely must disintegrate. National policies become
unpredictable again." TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM, supranote 67, at 59.
73. This was most notable in Buchanan's books in the second half of the 1970s,
e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN
(1975); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEHCIT: THE
POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977). Buchanan reviewed the development of
public choice theories, including his own, JAMES M. BUCHANAN, From Private
Preferences to Public Philosophy: the Development of Public Choice, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS 41-42 (1991).
74. Jan Tumlir, Economic Policy as a Constitutional Problem, Lecture Before the
Royal Society of Arts (Oct. 24, 1984), in ECONOMIC POLICY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEM (1984); TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM, supra note 67, at 13-17.
DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 1
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executive branch and raised the issue of proper delegation. In doing
so, he echoed public-choice theorists. 75 In a democracy, Tumlir
contended, clear rules allow citizens to scrutinize the policy-making
process while discretion on the side of the executive branch deprives
citizens' participation; the constitution is "the instrument which
structures the political discussion." 76 Thus, Tumlir urged that the
legislatures provide detailed instructions to the executive branch,
"[t]he lack of a clear legislative statement of policy not only weakens
or makes impossible judicial control; it also prevents cabinet
ministers from being in full control of their departments." 77 For
Tumlir, the legislative statement of policy is to be the legal rule
controlling the executive branch, just as for Bentham a legal code
controls the common law judges. 78
In 1983, Tumlir argued that "the international economic order is
essentially a reflection of national constitutional control." 79 Tumlir's
proposal was to limit executive discretion by domestic as well as
international rules: "[t]he main function of the rules has been to
limit governmental discretion in those aspects of economic policy
which may have significant repercussions abroad." 80 Thus in
Tumlir's rule-based international economic order:
These [rules] are predominantly in the nature of negative

75.

BERNARD SCHWARTZ,

THE

NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK

THE LEGAL CLOCK (1990) (an analysis and critique of Richard A. Posner, Richard A.

Epstein, and Justice Scalia, among others).
76. Jan Tumlir, International Economic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism,
supra note 69, at 77.
77. TUMLIR, ECONOMIC POLICY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM 19 (1984), supra
note 74. Similarly, in InternationalEconomic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism,
Tumlir argued that, "[p]roperly delegated power must be accompanied by specific
instructions and clear standards according to which it is to be used." Jan Tumlir,
InternationalEconomic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism,supra note 69, at 78.
78. Tumlir indicated that this was therefore for democratic purpose, "an oftforgotten function of clear legal rules as an instrument of policy: they are the only
means by which the average citizen can make any sense of the complex policy issues
confronting him and form a view as to whether a policy is succeeding or failing."
TuMuR, ECONOMIC POLICY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM 14 (1984), supra note 74.
79. Jan Tumlir, International Economic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism,
supra note 69, at 80.
80. Id. at 74. See also Jan Tumlir, InternationalEconomic Order:Rules, Cooperation
and Sovereignty, in ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1-15 (Peter Oppenheimer
ed., 1978) [hereinafter Tumlir, International Economic Order].
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ordinances, specifying what governments are not to do lest
economic relations between independent units in different
countries, the true international co-operation, be unduly
disturbed. In short, the purpose of these rules is to minimize
governmental interference with the adjustment process. In this
largely negative way the international rules define the legitimate
rights of states within the order, in much the same way as national
81
law defines individual rights.
Tumlir's theory of rule-based world trade was based on two
fundamental points in neo-liberal economics: private property and
the price system. In this respect, Tumlir associated himself with
Reagan-Thatcher economic policy on the international level.
B. John Jackson and Implementing the GAIT
John Jackson pioneered the study of international trade law as
an academic discipline through his book World Trade and the Law of
GATT (1969),82 which quickly became the "bible" for trade officials
in the 1970s. 83 Surrounded by trade diplomats at the time, Jackson,
as a lawyer, was more interested in the role of national law in the
international trading system than diplomacy.8 4
In general, he

81. Tumlir, InternationalEconomic Order, supra note 80. Similarly, "The rules are
cast largely in the negative mode and seek to suppress national policies interfering
unduly with private international transactions. The rules are, in other words,
designed to protect the world market against governments."
TUMLIR,
PROTECTIONISM, supra note 67, at 12.
82. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).

83. According to Hudec, Jackson's treatise in 1969 "did exert a decisive
influence on the speed and direction of that development [of the field]." Robert E.
Hudec, Tribute: The Expedition to Darkest Geneva, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 121, 123-24

(1999).
84. The title of the last chapter in his book is "Law: Obstacle or Implement for
International Trade Regulation," JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT,
supra note 82, at 755. This was a good contrast with Hudec, who was more
fascinated by diplomacy. See generally Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A
Diplomat's Jurisprudence,4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615 (1970). Hudec specifically stated
his difference with Jackson this way: "Although I share Jackson's preference for
moving to a more effective legal structure, I believe the more limited ambitions of
the 1947 design are still the only ones that can hope to be achieved in the
foreseeable future. Consequently, I think the architects of the new GATT would be
better advised to try to get the old machine running again." Robert E. Hudec, GA7T
or GABB? The Future Design of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L.J.
1299, 1373 (1971).
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favored a rule-oriented trade system, and called for "greater
attention to the 'law' of GATT."85 He warned that, "[flailure to
develop legal institutions can come back to haunt the world ...if a
86
real crisis occurs and the structure begins to break apart."
However, the diplomatic crises before the Tokyo Round
negotiations stunned even Jackson, and forced to the fore the
institutional weakness of the GATT.87 It was during this period of
time that he began to reflect more on the fundamental differences
between the rule-oriented and power-oriented approaches, and he
was convinced that the way to overcome the crises was to adopt the
rule-oriented approach. In his view:
A rule-oriented approach seeks to establish longer-range
principles on which nations and subordinate entities within
nations can reasonably rely. If rule making is done appropriately
(which often requires reliance on power-oriented discourses),
rules can offer the "players" in world affairs a greater degree of
predictability and stability, a higher sense of fairness, a
probability that longer-term objectives will not be overlooked in
the hurried atmosphere of short-term crises and ad hoc solutions,
and usually greater efficiency through the ability to delegate to
lower-level officials more of the operation of the "system." 88

85. John H. Jackson, The Puzzle of GATT - Legal Aspects of a SurprisingInstitution,
1 J. WORLD TRADE L. 131, 161 (1967).
86. Jackson warned that, "[s]o far GATT has existed in a period of overall
growth and growing prosperity. In such a period nations as well as individuals
become confident and sometimes lax. Failure to develop legal institutions can come
back to haunt the world however, if a real crisis occurs and the structure begins to
break apart. It may break apart anyway, of course, but it would be tragic if the
destruction were aided by misunderstandings engendered by a lack of adequate
legal craftsmanship, or by the absence of appropriate institutions worked out in
advance and impossible to develop during the heat of a crisis." Id.
87. "[P]erhaps one of the most important causes of our current crisis
challenging the trading system is the weakness and near breakdown of the
international institutional framework for the trading system." John H. Jackson, The
Crumbling Institutionsof the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 93, 96 (1978).
The crises at this period also proved that what Jackson had warned in the late 1960s
was right, nevertheless they radicalized Jackson's views of the world trading
system.
88. John H. Jackson, Strengthening the InternationalLegal Framework of the GATTMTN System: Reform Proposalsfor the New GATT Round, in THE NEw GATT ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 3, 7 (ErnstUlrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988) [hereinafter Jackson, Strengthening
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Not surprisingly, Jackson found in Jan Tumlir a theoretical ally.
Jackson cited Tumlir with approval and for support from time to
time.89 They both attributed the crises in diplomacy to the lack of a
rule-oriented system; they both considered court-like adjudication
as an alternative to the diplomatic approach. At the core of
Jackson's rule-oriented approach was the need to strengthen the
dispute settlement mechanism of GATr. Starting in the late 1970s,
Jackson made several reform proposals, all of which sought to make
the GATT dispute settlement process more formal, more
adjudication-like, and the panelists more professionally qualified.
In 1976, Jackson joined a group of academic and practicing lawyers
of the American Society of International Law in proposing a
wholesale change to the GATT framework, 90 including a stronger
dispute settlement process with judicial nature. In 1979, in the wake
of the Tokyo Round, Jackson proposed an "Outline of a Protocol of
the Resolution of Trade and Economic Disputes." 91 In 1984, in
Implementing the Tokyo Round,92 Jackson and his co-authors not only
treated the Tokyo Round GATT agreements as international law,
they even proposed direct citizen access to the international dispute
procedures, in order for the national governments to take their

GATT-MTN System].
89. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING T-fE GATT SYSTEM 55 (1990); see

also Jackson, Strengthening GA TT-MTN System, supra note 88, at 4.
90. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, RE-MAKING THE SYSTEM OF WORLD
TRADE: A PROPOSAL FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM (1976) (a report by the Panel on

International Trade Policy and Institutions, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy)
(the Panel was co-chaired by Anthony Solomon and Robert Hertzstein; members
include some practitioners, and a group of scholars, listed as follows: John H.
Barton, Richard N. Gardner, John Jackson, Eric Stein, Stanley D. Metzger, Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Gabriel Wilner, and Isaiah Frank).
91. John H. Jackson, Governmental Disputes in International Trade Relations: A
Proposal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 1 (1979); William J. Davey,
IATO Dispute Settlement: Segregating the Useful Political Aspects and Avoiding 'OverLegalization', in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 291, n.3 (Marco

Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000). William J.Davey noted in 2000 that one of
Jackson's proposals of 1979, i.e., a permanent roster of panelists, was put forward
by the European Communities in the 1998-99 DSU review.
92. JACKSON, ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND (1984). An advance and
summary version of the book was published as a long article in 1982. See John H.
Jackson, et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing International
Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv. 267 (1982).
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international obligations seriously.93 After the Uruguay Round
began, Jackson again proposed to reform the GATT framework, 94
including creation of the World Trade Organization in order to
build a stronger international institution. 95 Underlying Jackson's
incredible efforts to rebuild GATT seems to be an internationalism
based on neo-liberal conviction. Like Tumlir, who had little trust in
the bureaucracies of GATT member governments, Jackson remained
skeptical of the diplomats who represented short-term and political
interests. In Jackson's model, lawyers represented "longer-term"
interests and could bring predictability to the system. 96 The
international structure would never be strong enough and
predictability would never be achieved without the expertise of the
legal profession.
Shortly before his untimely death, Tumlir published a review of
Jackson's book Implementing the Tokyo Round.97 Interestingly, Tumlir
showed some unease with the proposals and considered Jackson
and his collaborators "internationalists." 98 Tumlir did not like the
idea of private access to international trade dispute settlement

93. JACKSON, ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND, supra note 92, at 205. ("In
a society where citizens have direct access to judicial institutions to enforce their
rights, and have the right to rely directly on the international agreements or on
statutory implementation that embraces the language of the agreements, it would
seem plausible that the international agreements would be treated seriously. On
the other hand, where such institutional mechanisms are not available to the
ordinary citizen, or where whatever does exist contains considerable leeway for the
play of governmental discretion, it is possible that at some point government
officials involved will find themselves tempted to apply the international
obligations less rigorously.").
94. Jackson, Strengthening the GA TT-MTN System, supranote 88.
95. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAT SYSTEM, supra note 89. For a comment
of the proposal in 1989, see Robert Howse, The House that Jackson Built: Restructuring
the GATF System, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 107 (1999).
96. "It is the lawyer's role to slow down the politician's drive for the 'quick fix'
of short-term, ad hoc solutions, in order to ensure that more subtle and often less
explicit longer-term important goals are not sacrificed to the exigencies of the
moment." Jackson, Strengthening the GATF-MTN System, supra note 88, at 5.
97. Jan Tum-lir, Conceptions of the InternationalEconomic and Legal Order,8 WORLD
ECONOMY 85 (1985) (reviewing JACKSON, ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND,
supra note 92) [hereinafter Tumlir, Review of Jackson].
98. A stronger critique of Jackson and his collaborators was in Philip R.
Trimble, Book Review: International Trade the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L. REv. 1016,
1019 (1985) (a critique of the idea of "supercourt" in the book).
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because it "would be destructive of international order, crippling
diplomacy by bringing it into a head-on conflict with the national
judicial process, the obvious agency for vindicating individual
rights." 99 Tumlir hoped that this could be accomplished by the
national courts at member-state level, thus he proposed "that the
main international effort should be directed to securing more perfect
national justiciability of the personal rights which it is the ultimate
function of international agreements to protect." 100 This exchange
between Tumlir and Jackson is interesting because it shows that
even though the two share a similar "capture" theory and belief in
free trade, their solution was markedly different.
C. Ernst-UlrichPetersmann:GATT's FirstLegal Officer
Inspired by Jackson,101 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann became GATT
Secretariat's first legal officer in 1981. Two years later, an Office of
Legal Affairs was set up at the GATT Secretariat. It was gradually
accepted that Petersmann, as the legal advisor, could participate in
all GATT dispute settlement proceedings1 02 Petersmann soon made

99. See Tumlir, Review of Jackson, supra note 97, at 87.
100. See id.
101. As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann recalled that, reading Jackson's book World
Trade and the Law of GATT had a great influence to his own interests in research: "in
the late 1970s, influenced not only the choice of the subject and of its constitutional
and comparative law approach for my 'habilitation book,' Constitutional Functions
and Constitutional Problems of International Economics Law - Foreign Trade Law and
Policy in the United States, Switzerland and the EC. It also contributed to my
acceptance of an offer, in 1980, to start working inside 'the machinery' of the GATT
Secretariat as the first legal officer ever employed by the GATT (which formally
established a 'legal office' only in 1983)." Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Tribute: On the
Constitution of John Jackson, 20 MICH. J.INT'L L. 149, 151 (1999).
102. Ivo van Bael, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure, 22 J. WORLD TRADE, 67
(1988). Mr. Van Bael notes that, the GATT Secretariat provided secretary assistance
to the GATT panels, it "not only prepares the summary of the proceedings, but also
engages in research and drafts the report of the panel, so his function is akin to that
of a law clerk. Recently, the practice has developed for a member of the
Secretariat's Legal Department to be present at the panel meetings to ensure the
proper interpretation of the GATF rules and case law." Id. at 69. Pierre Pescatore,
The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism - Its Present Situation and Its Prospects, 27 J.
WORLD TRADE 5, 8 (1993) (noting that, each GATT panel "is attended by a
representative of GATT's legal department, who advises the panel on points of law
and helps in the drafting of the findings"); PAR HALLSTROM, THE GATT PANELS AND
THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 155 (1994) (noting that since the
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his contribution to GATT in legal affairs through three publications:
Status of Legal Instruments, a revised GATT Analytical Index and the
annual Basic Instruments and Selected Documents. 0 3
These
publications proved to be a crucial step towards a more
sophisticated legal system. But Petersmann's contribution to GATT
is not limited to these specific and technical matters; his ideas
contributed both to the technical improvement of the legal work at
the Secretariat as well as to the more general philosophy at
GATT/WTO.104
Simply put, Petersmann's theory is a combination of those of
Tumlir and Jackson. Petersmann was clearly impressed by Tumlir's
theory of protectionism as a "constitutional failure." 105 Petersmann

Legal Office was created, "it has played a very conscious role in strengthening the
legal character of the GATT as a whole.").
103. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM,
at xiv (1997) [hereinafter PETERSMANN, DISPUTE SETrLEMENT].
104. Perhaps the importance and contribution of the Legal Affairs Office was
best summarized by Hudec, when commenting on the DISC cases: "The greatest
improvement in the quality of GATT legal decisions over the past decade has come,
not from creating better panels, but from creating a legal staff in the GATT
Secretariat. The legal staff was a legacy of the DISC case, one of its lessons taken to
heart. Reinforcing that legal staff is a logical extension of the lesson. It would
probably be the most effective contribution to the quality of GATT legal practice in
the immediate future." Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures:
The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1508 (1988).
105. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem: On the
'Domestic Policy Functions' of InternationalTrade Rules, 41 Swiss REV. INT'L ECON. REL.
405, 417-22 (1986) (discussing Tumlir's theory of protectionism) [hereinafter
Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem]; Emst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 20 COMM.
MKT. L. REV. 397, 422 (1983) (quoting Tumlir that GATT rules can be seen as the
"second line of domestic constitutional entrenchment") [hereinafter Application of
GATT]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersman, Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of the
GA7T Multilateral Trade System: Possibilities and Problems of Making GATT Rules
Effective in Domestic Legal Systems, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 48 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
& Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988) (citing Tumlir for support in arguing that the basic
principles of GATT law are but an international extension of the principles of
democratic constitutionalism); id. at 63-65, 102 (arguing trade protectionism as
"constitutional failure," using Tumlir's term and citing Tumlir for support)
[hereinafter Petersmann, Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework].
In doing that, Petersmann found support from the public choice theory:
Petersmann, Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework, supra at 47-48; Ernst-Ulrich
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extended this to the European Communities ("EC"). He argued that
within the EC there were problems of broad delegation to the
executive branches of governments and lack of transparency in
policymaking, which led to protectionist policies. However, the
"constitutional failure" within the framework of member states in
the EC could and should be rectified by "external constraints" such
as the Treaty of Rome and the GATT agreements.106
For
Petersmann, the function of "external constraints" was not only
based on the general position in European jurisprudence that
international agreements, such as GATT, are supreme over the
domestic law of the member states.
Rather, according to
Petersmann, there is a clear intent on the side of the member states
that they need these "external constraints" in order to overcome
deficiencies in domestic political process:
States conclude international agreements and participate in
international organizations in order to promote their national
Petersmann, Rights and Duties of States and Rights and Duties of Their Citizens, in
RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FUR DUDOLF BERNHARDT

1100-04 (Ulrich Beyerlin, Michael Bothe, Rainer Hofmann & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, eds., 1995) [hereinafter Petersmann, Rights and Duties of States].
Petersmann uses public choice theory to explain why national governments need
international trade agreements such as Uruguay Round, NAFTA, EEA. See id. at
1103; see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading
System through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EURo.
J. INT'L L. 161 (1995).
106. Petersmann believes that,
No democratic government, including the institutions of the EEC, can
achieve its policy goals without a framework of general rules and
procedures ensuring that the goal is not sacrificed to short-term exigencies
or to pressures from domestic interest groups and thereby protecting the
internal sovereignty against erosion resulting from a long series of
privileges granted to organized groups.
Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, International and European Foreign Trade Law: GA7T
Dispute Settlement ProceedingsAgainst the EEC, 22 CoMM. MKT. L. REV. 441,484 (1985)
[hereinafter Petersmann, GA7T Dispute Settlement Against the EEC]. See also
PETERSMANN, DISPUTE SETrLEMENT, supra note 103, at 23; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
The Foreign Policy Constitution of the European Union: A Kantian Perspective, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMACKER: ZUM SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG 433-47
(Ulrich Immenga, Wernhard Moschel & Dieter Reuter eds., 1996) (discussing
foreign policy constitution at EU, arguing that Kant's rights-based theory offers
ways to reconcile the equal freedoms of citizens as well as the most effective and
most democratic way towards constitutionalizing the internal and external powers
of the EU) [hereinafter Petersmann, A Kantian Perspective].
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2009]

interests. These national interests relate not only to "foreign
policy goals"... [but also] to promote international "public
goods" like legal certainty, predictability and transparency of
government interventions and the considerable reduction of
107
international transaction costs made possible thereby.

Therefore, Petersmann calls this the "constitutional function" or
i
the "domestic policy function" of GATT in the context of the EC. 08
One of Petersmann's main critiques of the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") was that it denied direct invocation of GATT rules by
citizens of the EC. 109 Like both Tumlir and Jackson, Petersmann
107. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member - Legal Conflicts
between GATT Law and European Community Law, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
GATT 28 (Meinhard Hilf, Francis G. Jacobs & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1986)
[hereinafter Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member]. See also Petersmann, Trade
Policy as a ConstitutionalProblem, supra note 105, at 408-08 ("The international GATT
obligations can serve as a remedy to this built-in opposition to liberal trade and to
the protectionist 'producer bias' in domestic decision-making about trade policy
within most governments...").
108. According to Petersmann,
[In the fact that international rules for non-discriminatory trade
competition serve important "constitutional functions" for the national
trade laws and decision-making processes within States. There are good
reasons to assume that essential principles of Community law as well as of
the national constitutional laws of many States - such as legal certainty and
limited delegation of powers, non-discrimination and undistorted
competition, "due process" and fair application of the law, protection of
individual freedoms and property rights - cannot properly function in the
field of foreign trade without observance of general rules for nondiscriminatory and transparent trade policies such as those embodied in

GATT law.
Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member, supra note 107, at 28. Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, On the Domestic Policy Functions of International Trade Rules, in
PROTECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT (Heinz Hauser ed., 1986); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem, supra note 105; Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration, 46 Swiss
REv. INT'L ECON. REL. (AuSSENWIRTSCHAFT) 247 (1991); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, A
Kantian Perspective, supra note 106; PETERSMANN, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note

103, at 25-34.
109. Petersmann, Application of GATT, supra note 105; Petersmann, GATT Dispute
Settlement ProceedingsAgainst the EEC, supra note 106; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The
EEC as a GATT Member, supra note 107; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Limited
Government and Unlimited Trade Policy Powers? Why Effective Judicial Review and a
Liberal Constitution Depend on Individual Rights, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 537-62 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
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believed that the rights-based approach would be able to avoid the
problem of capture. For Petersmann, the "constitutional function"
of GATT rules meant that the ideas of constitutionalism should be
expanded to trade, and trade should be viewed as a right under
constitutional protection. 110
Considering that Petersmann viewed the EC as a federal
system, his propositions were tantamount to advocating that the
GATT rules have direct effect and thus be self-executing in the EC.
In that sense, he was still within Tumlir's model of international
economic order. However, Petersmann does not share Tumlir's
cautions about Jackson's "internationalist" approach; rather, he did
not see a real conflict between the two models. He supported the
idea of a strong domestic judicial review,'
and he wanted a
stronger judicial review at the EC federal level. In the meantime,
however, he embraced and appreciated Jackson's proposals for a
stronger dispute GATT settlement. His faith in the system was so
strong that even at times when the WTO was most severely
criticized, Petersmann insisted that the WTO adjudication was a
revolution," 2 and relentlessly marketed the WTO model to other
international organizations. 113
eds., 1993); Petersmann, Rights and Duties of States, supra note 105.
110. Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem, supra note 105; ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism, Constitutional Law and European Integration,
supra note 108. In one of his more recent articles, Petersmann even goes as far as
arguing that trade be regarded as human rights, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO
Constitution and the Millennium Round, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 111-34 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law in the 21st Century: The
Need to Clarify Their Interrelationships,4 J.INT'L ECON. L. 3 (2001).
111. See, e.g., Petersmann, Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework, supra note
105.
112. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in InternationalEconomic
Law - Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-economic Areas,
2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 189 (1999).
113. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law?
Contribution by the World Trade Organization Appellate Body Review System, 1 J.INT'L
ECON. L. 25 (1998); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the UN System?
Constitutionalism,International Law and InternationalOrganizations, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 421 (1997); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations: Lessons
from the InternationalEconomic Law Revolution, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 185
(1997); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations? Lessons from the
'International Economic Law Revolution', 53 Swiss REV. INT'L ECON. REL. 193 (1998);
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D. The Institutional Transformation of GAIT
Public-choice economics had a clear prescriptive message: how
to rebuild the international economic order. 114 Gradually, the
international institutions, such as GATT/WTO, would take the
responsibility of restraining and disciplining the decision-making
process of the member states. The GATT/WTO represented the
"public interest" of consumers all over the world, and was intended
to counterbalance the advantages of the special interests groups
embodied in the protectionist trade policies.1 1 5 This was how the
arguments for international "public institutions" and the idea of
"rule-based" order in international trade arose and gained
popularity over the last two decades. In line with this perspective,
problems in the international economic order were increasingly
perceived as a failure in compliance, rather than in policy
coordination. Attention was focused on the legal rather than the
political or policy issues. In the last two or three decades efforts
have been made to strengthen the legal apparatus. Essentially,
"public institutions" such as GATT/WTO are regarded as legal
instruments to counterbalance the alleged protectionist attempts that
often prevail in the domestic politics of member states. In this
respect, slogans, such as "rule-based" or "rule-oriented" system,
were posed as a contrast to the so-called "GATT-pragmatism,"
which was said to prevail in the first few decades after GATT was
established. 116

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to ConstitutionalizeInternationalLaw and Foreign Policy
for the Benefit of Civil Society, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
114. In the U.S. domestic context, Daniel Farber provides the best critiques of
public-choice theorists' denial of their normative positions. See, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique,68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1565 (1995).
115. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a PublicInstitution: The Uruguay Round
and Beyond, 18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 31 (1992); J. Michael Finger, The GATT as an
International Discipline over Trade Restrictions: A Public Choice Perspective, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 125-41 (Roland Vaubel &

Thomas D. Willett eds., 1991); Judith Goldstein, International Institutions and
Domestic Politics: GATT, VATO and the Liberalization of International Trade, in THE
WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133-52 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998).
116. This was elaborated by Oliver Long, former Director-General of GATT,
1968-80, as late as in 1985. See OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1987). See also John G. Ruggie, International Regimes,
Transactionsand Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-war Economic Order, 36 INT'L
ORG. 379 (1982).
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In the 1980s, the concerns over transparency in domestic policymaking were influenced by two studies within the GATT
framework.1 7 The first was Trade Policies for a Better Future:
Proposals for Action,118 prepared in 1985 by a group of eminent
experts headed by Fritz Leutwiler, former President of the World
Bank (the "Leutwiler Report"). The other was Public Scrutiny of
Protection: Domestic Policy Transparency and Trade Liberalization
(Special Report No.7), 119 conducted in 1989 by the Trade Policy
Research Center chaired by Oliver Long, former Director-General of
GATT (the "Long Report").
i. The Leutwiler Report
The Leutwiler Report was initiated in November 1983 by the
Direct-General of GATT, because GATT "was widely perceived to
be losing its grip on the evolution and conduct of trade relations." 120
In response to this crisis, the main theme of the Leutwiler Report
was transparency. The Report took pains to explain why open trade
was better trade, 121 and its first recommendation was "the making of
trade policy should be brought into the open."122 It noted that
"[m]ost governments come to trade policy decisions behind closed
117. For a discussion of the two reports, see Gary Banks, Transparency,
Surveillance and the GATF System, in IN WHOSE INTEREST: DUE PROCESS AND
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 55, 66-68 (Michael M. Hart & Debra P.
Steger eds., 1992).
118. Fritz Leutwiler, et al., Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposalsfor Action,
reproduced in ARTHUR DUNKEL, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETrER FUTURE: THE 'LEUTWILER
REPORT', THE GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 9-70 (Dodrecht: M. Nijhoff 1987)
[hereinafter "The Leutwiler Report"].
119. OLWER LONG, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF PROTECTION: DOMESTIC POLICY
TRANSPARENCY AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION (Special Report No. 7, 1989).
120. Arthur Dunkel, Trade Policies for a Better Future and the Uruguay Round,
TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE: THE 'LEUTWILER REPORT', THE GATT AND THE
URUGUAY ROUND 2 (Dodrecht: M. Nijoff 1987). Dunkel continues, "it was a
frustrating time for those of us in the GATT who were watching, daily, a bad
situation getting worse but without having the tools or the support to do much
about it other than issuing perpetual warnings of the dangers the world was facing
and trying, as best we could, to limit the damage. In a sense, the gathering of the
group, under the chairmanship of Dr Fritz Leutwiler, was a modest attempt at
breaking the log-jam." Id.
121. See the title of the second chapter of the Leutwiler Report, supra note 118, at
29-38.
122. Id. at 41.
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doors, particularly on such questions as whether protection should
be granted to a specific industry." 123 How to achieve transparency?
One aspect the Leutwiler Report recommended was to strengthen
surveillance functions of the GATT, specifically, "[a]t the
international level, trade policy and the functioning of the trading
system should be made more open. Countries should be subject to
regular oversight or surveillance of their policies and actions, about
which the GATT Secretariat should collect and publish
information." 124 For this purpose, there were two specific proposals
to make the surveillance mechanism work. First, at GATT, there
should be periodic examination of trade policies of member
countries, so that member governments could explain and defend
their trade policies. Second, "the GATT Secretariat should be
empowered to initiate studies on national trade policies, to collect,
maintain, and publish information on trade policy measures and
actions; to call for further information and clarification regarding
these measures and actions; and to invite discussion of them."125
The Leutwiler Report also recommended a strengthened
dispute settlement mechanism. Recommendation twelve suggested
that, "GATT's dispute settlement procedures should be reinforced
by building up a permanent roster of non-governmental experts to
examine disputes, and by improving the implementation of panel
recommendations ... ."126 The Report even went further, suggesting
that GATT dispute resolution should be more than a private solution
of disagreements between the defendant and plaintiff. Since the
contracting parties all have interests in full conformity with the
rules, the Leutwiler Report recommended that third parties should
complain when bilateral agreements break the rules, 127 and that
Direct-General of GATT should be able to initiate mediation and
conciliation at an early stage in disputes. 128 In this way, the
Leutwiler Report advocated giving a lot of power to the GATT
Direct-General. In a separate article, de Lacharri~re, a member of
the Leutwiler group, was more frank in calling the function of the

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 54.
See id. (Referring to recommendation 12 of the Leutwiler Report).
Id. at 55.
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GATT that of an attorney-general. 29 Shortly after the Leutwiler
Report, many of the recommendations were incorporated into the
Punta del Este Declaration in September 1986.130
ii. The Long Report
The Long Report has a close intellectual connection with Jan
Tumlir and his followers' skepticism of domestic politics. 131 It
employed the terms and reasoning of public choice extensively and
argued that, as a consequence of pressures from interest-groups and
fragmented administrative structures, 132 there is an "inherent bias"
133
in domestic policymaking process in favor of protectionism.
These elements created a deep crisis in international trade. 34
Transparency was considered to be the main remedy. However,
unlike the Leutwiler Report, the Long Report proposed a cabinetlevel governmental agency at the national level, not on an
international level. The new institutions were to meet three
requirements: the institution should 1) be independent from
domestic political pressures; 2) be structured in such a way as to
have a broad mandate to enquire into all forms of economic
adjustment issues; and 3) purely advisory, with no executive and
judicial role. 135 The Long Report clearly dismissed the legalistic

129. De LacharriOre recommends a reform, "by which the right of action would
no longer be subject to a request by a party alleging that the balance of advantages
had been altered to its detriment, but would also be granted to an 'attorney-general'
and even to every contracting party on the basis of the general interest in
compliance with the GATT." Guy Ladreit de Lacharri~re, The Settlement of Disputes

between Contracting Parties to the GeneralAgreement, in

TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETrER

FUTURE 130 (1987).
130. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, GATT
B.I.S.D. (33 Supp.), at 19-28.
131. This can be seen from the extensive citations of Jan Tumlir and his followers
ideas in the Long Report, LONG, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF PROTECTION, supra note 119.
Gary Banks, Tumlir's colleague and intellectual disciple, was personally involved in
the work of the preparation work of the Long Report while he was a visiting fellow
at the Trade Policy Research Centre. Id. at xii.
132. LONG, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF PROTECTION, supranote 119, at 8-14.
133. Id. at 13.
134. The Long Report declared in the first sentence that, "The international
trading system, of which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is
the legal foundation, is in crisis." Id. at 1.
135. Id. at 27-28.
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approach within the framework of Article X of GATT. It noted that
"[i]t is... important to distinguish domestic transparency from
those provisions of the GATT that are designed to facilitate the
internationalscrutiny of each country's adherence to GATT rules and
to the bargains struck in trade negotiations. " 1 36 After a brief
discussion of notification and publicity rules under GATT, it
continued, "[wihile such provisions recognize the pressure to
conform to the rules that occur through exposure, domestic
transparency procedures are intended to bring wider domestic
influences to bear on the policy-making process, whereas the
international requirements can only attempt to verify the results of
policy decisions after the event." 137 On technical level, the Long
Report followed the ideas of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development proposal in 1987,138 and was likely inspired
by the experiences of Industries Assistance Commission ("IAC") in
Australia. 139 This is not surprising since both W. B. Carmichael and
Gary Banks, who led the IAC in the 1980s, 140 were both involved in
the Long study group.
The similarities and differences between the Leutwiler Report
and the Long Report reflect those between Jan Tumlir, John H.
Jackson and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann. They demonstrate that, even
within the GATT internal circle, "capture" theories did not offer any
guidance to the specific form of the solution. In this aspect, the
internal debates between the Leutwiler Report and the Long Report,

136. Id. at 23 (emphasis in original). Oliver Long himself and Rodney de C.
Grey, who was also in the Long team, were both skeptical of the legalistic approach
from the Tokyo Round. See OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 36, 61 (1985) (stressing the "GATT Pragmatism");
Rodney de C. Grey, The General Agreement after the Tokyo Round, in NON-TARIFF

BARRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND 3-18 (John Quinn & Philip Slayton, eds., 1982)
(expressing the concerns of the legalistic tendency during the Tokyo Round
negotiations).
137. LONG, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF PROTECTION, supra note 119, at 23.
138. UNCTAD Secretariat, Report to UNCTAD VII, Revitalizing Development,
Growth and International Trade: Assessment and Policy Options, 142-43; LONG, PUBLIC
SCRUTINY OF PROTECTION, supra note 119, at 26-27.
139. LONG, PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF PROTECTION (1989), supra note 119, at 38-40.
140. See Banks, supra note 117; W. B. Carmichael, National Interests and
International Negotiations, WORLD EcoN. (Dec. 1986); G. A. RATTIGAN & W. B.
CARMICHAEL,

TRADE

NATIONS (1996).
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between Tumlir, Jackson and Petersmann, echoed that between the
Both aspects of
young Posner and Stigler in the 1970s. 141
indeterminacy discussed earlier were present in the 1980s debates in
GATT. First, the descriptive part of the "capture" arguments did
not and could not determine where "capture" would stop. The Long
Report assumed that a cabinet-level government agency like the
ICA would be able to prevent "capture;" while the Leutwiler Report
adopted a more internationalist approach by assigning GATT
dispute settlement the function of preventing "capture." Neither
report explained how "capture" would not occur to the institution
they have proposed. Second, "capture" theories did not determine
the appropriate response to "capture." The Long Report was in
favor of a regulatory approach; while an adjudicatory approach was
proposed by the Leutwiler Report. Again, neither report explained
how their proposed approach was immune from "capture." In
other words, in both reports, there was a significant jump from the
descriptive "capture" claim to the prescriptive policy proposal of
"public institution." Despite their differences, both prescriptions
were characterized by their formal attributes - the "rule-oriented" (in
contrast with the "power-oriented"), the legal (in contrast with the
political), and compliance (in contrast with coordination). Thus, the
jump was "safe" because both the "capture" claims and the
prescriptions stayed in the formal domain that was detached from
any criterion in substance.
Indeterminacy in "capture" theories is rooted in the
disconnection between form and substance in their argumentative
structures. 142 It is even clearer here, once the historical context is
taken into consideration. In the 1980s, one typical area in which
"capture" theories were considered valuable was agricultural trade.
Developing countries had long been concerned about liberalization
of agricultural products and the insurmountable amount of
subsidies provided by the developed countries. 143 The WTO
Agreement on Agriculture ("AOA"), 144 the product of Uruguay
Round negotiations, aims to promote liberalization in market access,
141. See supra Part I, § B.
142. Id.
143. ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1987).
144. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTs 39-68 (GATT Secretariat 1994).

20091

Divided by Common Language

However, it was a
domestic support and export subsidies.
disappointment for many because it did little to control agricultural
subsidies from developed countries. 145 Thus, on one hand, the AOA
proves that the "capture" theorists were right - the departments of
agriculture were "captured" by big farms and their associations in
developed countries. On the other hand, however, it seems also
natural to ask: was the AOA itself also "captured?" Here the
indeterminacy problem comes into play. Since both the "capture"
claims and their prescriptions were in the formal/logical domain,
neither one would be able to guide the capture theorist in the real
world whether she should apply the "capture" argument on AOA
or the WTO itself. In a situation like this, a formalistic adherence to
the AOA rules means to deny developing countries' disappointment
and discontents in the substance of the AOA. But that position is
not decided by logic; it is an exercise of power.
The remainder of this article discusses a Third World
perspective of "capture" theories, which were developed in
resistance to globalization championed by the WTO (hereinafter,
Third World Resistance). What is interesting is that the Third World
Resistance and the WTO both share the value of free trade and the
vocabulary of "capture." A common theme amongst the Third
World Resistance theories is that they all challenge the GATT/WTO
"capture" theorists to apply "capture" critique to the WTO itself. In
the post-Seattle world, the orthodox "capture" theorists in WTO are
on the defensive. The trouble is that their earlier "capture" claims of
the 1980s offer little help by virtue of their own indeterminacy.
III. 'Capture' Theories in Resistance
The WTO is facing growing critiques from developing countries
in the aftermath of the 1999 Seattle debacle. These arguments are
exemplified by: (1) the Third World Approach to International Law
("TWAIL"); (2) the discontent of trade officials from the developing
countries (using India as the primary example); and (3) a growing
145. Kel6 Onyejekwe, GATT, Agriculture, and Developing Countries, 17 HAMLINE L.
REv. 77, 132-51 (1994) (a critique of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agricultural
sector from developing country perspective). We now know that substance of the
AOA was negotiated mainly between the U.S. and European Union as part of a
whole package deal in 1992, the so-called "Blair House accord." FATOUMATA
JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS/THE LESSONS OF CANCUN (2d ed.

2004).
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network of development economists associated with research
projects sponsored by the World Bank. Bringing the World Bank
into a discussion of resistance to globalization might sound unusual
for many. However, this third argument is used to suggest that the
WTO is unwilling to engage in a genuine dialogue, because the
debate is really not about free-trade per se. All three arguments
actually demand for more and freer trade. The very fact that
challengers of the WTO are often assumed to be anti-free-trade
might be the biggest myth that the WTO has successfully created.
A. The Third World Approach to InternationalLaw
The TWAIL is a left-wing school of thought with a strong
perspective of the developing countries. 146 Inspired by Edward Said
and his disciples in the post-colonial studies, TWAIL approaches
international law, and international order, from the standpoint of
the Third World countries colonial experience in history and the
neo-liberal economic and political order of today. It argues that
colonialism was central to the constitution of international law and
its key doctrines such as sovereignty.
In Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law
(2004), 147 Antony Anghie argues that the notion sovereignty was
formulated by classic international lawyers, with a key
consideration being the exclusion of the non-European states. 148
Having been denied sovereignty, "non-European states exercised no
rights recognizable by international law over their own territory,"
while "European states could inflict massive violence on nonEuropean peoples." 149 Therefore, "[s]overeignty was... aligned
with European ideas of social order, political organization, progress

146. Members of this school include Antony Anghie, Karin Mickelson,
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, James Gathii, Joel Ngugi, and B. S. Chimni. See THE THIRD
WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION (Antony

Anghie et al. eds., 2003); BALAKRISHNAN

RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM
BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); B.

S. Chimni, The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World
Approach, 8 MELB. J. INT'L L. 499 (2007) [hereinafter Chimni, A Critical Third World
Approach].
147. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

148. Id. at 32-114.
149. Id. at 103.

(2004).
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and development." 150 Colonialism in international law does not end
at the classic period. For Anghie, colonialism also lies beneath the
mandate system of the League of Nations, in the post-colonial states,
in globalization, and the global war on terror. 5 1 For example,
globalization dictated by the international financial institutions (the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and the WTO has
astonishing similarities to the League of Nation's mandate system,
or the nineteenth-century colonial experience. The Third World is
still denied full sovereignty. While western sovereignty is protected
against intrusion of international law, non-European states have
invariably been subject to international law in the name of "good
governance," as defined by neo-liberal terms.
In addition,
"[w]hatever the rhetoric, as to humanism and the welfare of the
non-European peoples, commerce has been the controlling
preoccupation of colonial governance. The situation is not
152
significantly different now."
At least two themes in Anghie's discussion are shared by other
TWAIL scholars. One is the continuity of colonialism underpinning
international law. Karin Mickelson, for example, traces colonialism
in the Third World movements of the 1960s and 1970s.15 3 The other
is the hidden functions of vocabulary in the process of sociopolitical
discourse; "many international lawyers, from both the First and the
Third world write as if international law came to the colonies fully
formed and ready for application, as if the colonial project simply
entailed assimilating these aberrant societies into an existing, stable,
'Eurocentric' system ....
"154 Anghie argues that this is wrong, as
the discipline's key doctrines such as sovereignty, are developed in
55
the process and at the service of the colonial encounter.
Specifically, "these doctrines were created for the explicit purpose of
excluding the colonial world, ...
This exclusion, and the
imperialism which it furthers, constitute in part the primordial and
156
essential identity of international law."
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 269.
153. Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal
Discourse, 16 WIs. INT'L L.J. 353 (1998).
154. ANGHIE, supra note 147, at 103.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 315.
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TWAIL also has an intellectual link with the Marxian tradition
in India.' 57 For example, B. S. Chimni, Chair of the Centre for
International Legal Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, warned
that "[tihe threat of re-colonization is haunting the world." 158 In
addition, a class system is still present because "for Marxists it is not
possible to characterize a legal system without indicating the
dominant class or classes which shape its content and whose
interests it predominantly serves." 159 Finally, the "structures and
processes that produced colonialism.., have now spawned neocolonialism." 160 By the term neo-colonialism, Chimni argues that, in
the era of globalization, Third World States are facing an increasing
erosion of sovereignty and autonomy by international institutions. 161
For instance, international economic institutions such as the WTO,
World Bank and the IMF dictate economic and monetary policies,
measured by neo-liberal slogans such as "free trade," and "good
governance." Property is redefined and redistributed by the WTO's
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
and international environmental institutions in the name of
"development." Moreover, human rights discourse is not only
internationalized, thus increasingly out of context, but also tends to
privilege private rights while overlooking social and economic
62
rights.1
Finally, TWAIL scholars are not against "free trade" as a
principle; but they oppose how the slogan is used to justify certain
157. B. S.

CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER:

A

CRITIQUE OF

211-96 (1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER]; B. S. Chimni, An Outline of a Marxist Course on Public International
Law, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); B. S. Chimni, Marxism and International Law: A
ContemporaryAnalysis, EcoN. & POL. WKLY 337 (1999).
158. B. S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to InternationalLaw: A Manifesto, in THE
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES

THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION

47

(Antony Anghie et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Chimni, Manifesto].
159. B. S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD

ORDER,

supra note 157, at 248.

160. Chimni, Manifesto, supra note 158, at 49. For Chimni, neo-colonialism in
international law refers to the contemporary, i.e., from 1945 to the present. See
CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 157, at 235-36.

161. B. S. Chimni, Manifesto, supra note 158, at 49; B. S. Chimni, International
Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
162. B. S. Chimni, The World Trade Organization, Democracy and Development: A
View from the South, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (Feb. 2006, No.1) [hereinafter Chimni, The
World Trade Organization].
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policies in a particular historical context. 63 First, neither Great
Britain nor the United States practiced free-trade when they were
developing. Second, "even today the principles of free-trade are not
allowed to prevail when it impinges on the interests of powerful
social classes." 164 Chimni refers to the agricultural sector to
illustrate this point: "the subsidies regime sustained by the
Agreement on Agriculture [is] a good example." 165 Chimni sounded
like a public-choice economist when he announced: "International
economic law has to be rescued from the clutches of the corporate
actor." 166 This led to another one of Chimni's critique of the WTO,
its democracy deficit. 167 "The general demand of Third World states
and social movements is that the principles of deliberative
democracy be respected viz., good argument and not power be
allowed to prevail."'168
B. The WTO Negotiation Process
TWAIL is not alone in the "capture" critique from the Third
World perspective. The "democratic deficit" of the WTO can be and
is argued from cosmopolitan point of view. 169 A totally different
perspective is that of trade officials of developing countries who
learn about the WTO not by reading Marx, but real experiences by
sitting at the negotiation table in Geneva, or in Seattle, Doha, or
Cancun. In Behind the Scenes at the WTO,170 Fatoumata Jawara and
Aileen Kwa, based on interviews of a wide range of third world
trade ministers and diplomats, revealed the lack of transparency
and bullying tactics employed by the United States and European
Union. In many aspects, India is not a typical developing country,
but its experience in trade negotiations is telling.
India was a founding member of the GATT in 1947. During the
Uruguay Round negotiations in the 1980s, India was told that
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Chimni, A Critical Third World Approach, supranote 146, at 512.
167. Chimni, The World Trade Organization, supranote 162, at 15.
168. Id. at 13.
169. For example, Rahul Singh, The World Trade Organization and Legitimacy:
Evolving a Framework for Bridging the Democratic Deficit, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 347

(2008).
170. JAWARA & KwA, supra note 145.
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liberalization would lead to higher prices and other favorable
conditions to the agriculture sector. 171 The government embraced
globalization as an alternative to its pre-existing economic policy
172
Its
characterized by over-regulation and underperformance.
economic reform of the 1990s was a deregulation movement,
including liberalization of the agricultural sector in conjunction with
reduction of subsidies. According to Anwarul Hoda, who worked
on multilateral trade negotiations in India's Ministry of Commerce
from 1985 to 1993, India was focused on understanding and
implementing the Uruguay Round rules, thus did not play any
active role until the Doha Round was started.1 73 Mr. Sompal' 74
expressed his discontent with this situation in January 2001 at a
high-level seminar on WTO in India. 75 He observed:

171. The conviction was so strong that the agricultural sector was a forgotten
topic in the discussion of social discourse, according to Professor Abhijit Sen of
Jawaharlal Nehru University, Dew Delhi. Abhijit Sen observed in 1992: "A curious
aspect of the current liberalization policies now being implemented with verve, and
amidst much debate, in India is that there is almost no discussion about the likely
impact on agriculture, barring the short-run concern about a possible monsoon
failure and the impact of this on inflation." Abhijit Sen, Economic Liberalization and
Agriculture in India, 20 SOCIAL SCIENTIST 4 (1992).
172. Baldev Raj Nayar, Political Structureand India's Economic Reforms of the 1990s,
71 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 335 (1998).
173. "During the Uruguay Round, when for the most part India followed
autarkic economic policies, India was concerned only about the implications of the
new rules and specific commitments for its own domestic policies and external
trade regime with respect to agriculture; it was not overly concerned about the
policies followed by its trading partners, particularly the major industrialized
countries. This attitude changed during the Doha Round, and from the outset India
called on the major industrialized countries to eliminate export subsidies and
substantially reduce domestic support and market access restrictions." ANWARUL
HODA & ASHOK GULATI, WTO NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE AND DEVELOPING

(2007).
174. Mr. Sompal was a member of the Planning Commission, an agency in the
Government of India.
175. The Seminar on WTO and Agriculture, January 20-21, 2001, was initiated by
the renowned Indian economist I. G. Patel, sponsored by three institutions: the
Gujarat Economic Association Silver Jubilee Trust, the Indian Council for Research
on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), New Delhi, and the Center for
Management in Agriculture, at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. A
collection of essays was published subsequently in WTO AGREEMENT & INDIAN
AGRICULTURE (Anwarul Hoda ed., 2002). Participants of the seminar included
Anwarul Hoda and Shri Sompal. Hoda, who was editor of the collected essays, was
COUNTRIES 64
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It is [now] widely recognized that there has been no significant
reduction in either domestic support or export subsidies in
agriculture.
It was anticipated that these cuts and the
contemplated fair trade regime would help efficient producers to
realize higher prices. On the contrary, the prices of most
agricultural commodities have declined. Empirical evidence
conclusively shows that there has not been much change in the
pattern of world trade and export since then. The anticipated
176
gains have almost completely eluded the developing countries.
Sompal attacked the inequality of the system, "[tihe only
achievement has been the defining of trade rules for international
trade, which have not been observed by anyone, least of all by the
developed countries." 177
In the subsequent WTO ministerial meeting in Doha in
November, India, like most developing countries, resisted in vain
the efforts of the EU and the U.S. and was among the last to sign the
Doha Declaration. 178 This frustration did not go unnoticed by the
U.S. or EU. Robert B. Zeollick, then the U.S. Trade Representative
taking part in the Doha meeting, acknowledged: "I know that many
developing
nations have
expressed
frustration with the
implementation of the Uruguay Round. The United States has
worked with other developed nations to address legitimate
concerns." 179 Similarly, Pascal Lamy, the then EC Commissioner,
acknowledged that the Doha meeting had neither succeeded "in
addressing
the
concerns
of
developing
countries
on
implementation," nor had it "reassured developing countries of our
then a professor at the ICRIER.
176. Shri Sompal, IATO Agreement an Indian Agriculture, in WTO AGREEMENT &
INDIAN AGRICULTURE 7 (Anwarul Hoda ed., 2002). A similar critique of the WTO
agricultural framework was offered by another participant of the seminar, Samar K.
Datta, Indian Agriculture: Domestic Reforms and WTO Negotiations, in WTO
AGREEMENT & INDIAN AGRICULTURE 65-80 (Anwarul Hoda ed., 2002). Dilip K. Das,

The Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Trade in Agriculture, 40 J.
WORLD TRADE 259 (2006); VIBHA MATHUR, WTO AND INDIA: DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 42-109 (2005) (discussing WTO and the Indian agriculture).

177. Sompal, supra note 176, at 7.
178. JAWARA & KWA, supra note 145, at 116-17. Jawara and Kwa also noted that,
India "played a unique role, as a leader, and often lone spokesperson, of the
developing world - and as the main scapegoat of the supporters of a new round."
Id. at 131.
179. United States Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade
Representative, WT/MIN(01)/ST3 (Nov. 10, 2001).
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lack of protectionist intent." 180 These confessions, when not
accompanied by real change in substance, however, become even
more problematic.
Some of India's high-level trade officials
remained critical of the WTO. Bhagirath Lal Das,181 in a detailed
comment on the Doha Ministerial Declaration, 182 observed:
For several years the developing countries have been drawing
attention to the severe imbalances and inequities in the WTO
agreements. The [Declaration], instead of eliminating the
imbalance, has in fact enhanced it by giving special treatment to
the areas of interest to the major developed countries and
183
ignoring the areas of interest to the developing countries.
Das believes that the so-called "development agenda" is not
only ironic, but also "quite erroneous," because the agenda "has
been totally set by the major developed countries guided by their
own economic interests. The priority of the development of the
developing countries is not reflected in it."184 For example, with
respect to the WTO Agriculture Agreement, Das suggested that
developed countries fulfil their earlier commitments and "totally
eliminate their domestic support and export subsidy immediately,
the latest by 2005."185
An interesting contrast is with comments made by Peter D.
Sutherland, who served as Director General of GATT from 1993 to
1995 and continues to chair the Consultative Board to the WTO
Director-General. 86 Sutherland typifies the orthodox WTO position,
180. European Communities Comnuission Statement by Mr. Pascal Lamy,
Commissioner for Trade, WT/MIN(01)/ST/4 (Nov. 10, 2001).
181. India's former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to GATT, who
subsequently served as Director of International Trade Program at the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD")
182. Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha,
WT/MIN(01)DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001).
183. BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, WTO: THE DOHA AGENDA - THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON
WORLD TRADE 3-4 (2003).
184. Id. at 4-5.
185. Id. at 79.
186. The Consultative Board includes: Jagdish Bhagwati, Kwesi Botchwey, Niall
FitzGerald, Koichi Hamada, John H. Jackson, Celso Lafter, and Thierry de
Montbrial. Sutherland's most prominent contribution to the debate on WTO was
perhaps the so-called "Sutherland Report," a report prepared by the Consultative
Board to WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi. PETER D. SUTHERLAND ET.
AL., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW
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which refuses to examine its own structure via "capture" theory,
even as it espouses it. Sutherland gave a telling explanation of the
"development agenda" at Doha:
a major reason for the adoption of the development agenda device
was the impact of the anti-globalization, anti-WTO movements in
the late 1990s and thereafter. The idea that developing countries
had been "losers" from the global trading system gained so much
of industrial countries and even the
currency that political leaders
7
WTO itself embraced it.18
Like Mike Moore, who was quite puzzled by the protest against
the WTO in Seattle, 8 8 Sutherland remains unconvinced, because
"the notion was always a gross exaggeration, certainly an over
simplification." 189 To this "exaggeration," Sutherland argues that
failures in developing countries are their own fault, not that of the
WTO.190 Sutherland shifts his target to bigger developing countries,
like Brazil, China and India, and calls on them to liberalize their
economy: "Many are successful exporters and are moving fast to
dominate global markets in a variety of farm products, industrial
goods and even services." 191 "And those members themselves owe
it to the rest of the developing country membership to be so
recognized and to take the consequences in terms of higher
1 92
obligations and commitments."
Given the gap in views, the impasse in Cancun in 2003 should
not be a surprise. What is surprising, however, is that Sutherland
continued to advocate his position despite the failure at Cancun.
For example, after the Cancun debacle, he somehow felt encouraged
MILLENNIUM (2004) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND, The Future of the

WTO].

187. Peter Sutherland, The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the
World Trading System - A Cosmopolitan Perspective,8 J.INT'L ECON. L. 363, 365 (2005).
188. MIKE MOORE, A WORLD WITHOUT WALLS: FREEDOM, DEVELOPMENT, FREE
TRADE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 8 (2003).
189. Sutherland, supra note 187, at 365.
190. "Developing countries that maintain highly protected markets, that offer no
security or predictability to investors or, indeed, to their own domestic firms, that
fail to put in place the institutional structures and practices that encourage rather
than hold back trade-led development have been and will be failures. Whether
they are members of the WTO or not will make little difference. The WTO provides
a framework for reform and secure access to markets; opportunities that are there
to be exploited, but which do not guarantee success." Id.
191. Id. at 369.
192. Id. at 370.
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by the July Framework of 2004,193 which he believed "[stood] out as
offering hope for a very substantial outcome." 194 In contrast, Indian
trade officials and think tanks were far less enthusiastic about the
July Framework. 95 The subsequent failures in August 2005 and in
January 2006 proved that they were probably right. Commenting
on the failure in August 2005, Anwarul Hoda noted that "for more
than a year the members had not shown any willingness to engage
in concrete terms on the levels of ambition of the reduction of
196
domestic support and market access."
Smaller developing countries perhaps feel more alienation in
the process. Sir LeRoy Trotman, Barbados Senator and General
Secretary of Barbados Workers' Union, commented that "[f]rom the
days preceding Marrakesh, therefore, the smaller countries of the
world found themselves embarked on an exercise which seems to be
one that is fraught with setbacks and contradictions." 197 In addition,
a survey conducted by Richard Blackhurst, Bill Lyakurwa and
Ademola Oyejide found that African countries continue to face
marginalization, and "Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in particular stands
out as a region of the world which is being largely by-passed in the
rapidly unfolding process of global integration." 198
C. The World Bank's Project
Public-choice "capture" theory was also spread to the World
Bank at about the same time as it conquered GATT. For example, in
193. Doha Work Programme, decision adopted by the General Council on Aug.
1, 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004) (known as the "July Framework").
194. Sutherland, supranote 187, at 366.
195. See Rajesh Aggarwal, Dynamics of Agriculture Negotiations in the World Trade
Organization, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 741 (2005) (the author is Counselor in the
Permanent Mission of India to the WTO, Geneva); Bhagirath Lal Das, Bumpy Road
to Hong Kong, ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4499 (Oct. 15, 2005); BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, THE
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WTO: OPTIONS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND RISKS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2006); V. S. GOPALAKRISHNAN, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AND INDIA: SOME INSIGHTS (2005) (the author was Director General of Mumbai-based

nonprofit organization World Trade Center from 1995 to 2005).
196. HODA &GULATI, supra note 173, at 231.
197. LeRoy Trotman, The WTO: The Institutional Contradictions,in DOHA AND
BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 19-25 (Mike Moore ed.,
2004).
198. Richard Blackhurst, Bill Lyakurwa & Ademola Oyejide, Options for
Improving African Participationin the WTO, 23 WORLD ECON. 491 (2000).
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the early 1970s, Professor Anne Krueger 99 developed the view that
import restriction is better explained by rent-seeking. 200 In 1977,
economist J. Michael Finger explicitly embraced the term "public
choice." 201 Finger served in the Treasury Department from 1974-80
during the Ford and Carter Administrations, and as a senior
economist and Director to the Office of Trade Research and Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Planning. In 1982,
Finger and his collaborators refined their views and made a classic
statement of public-choice theory in a study of international trade
entitled The Political Economy of Administered Protection.2 2 He
continued his public-choice critique of trade policy during the 1980s
and 1990s leading up to the formation of the WTO.203
Like the main architects of GATT, Finger expected the WTO to
be a public institution, which disciplined offending member
countries. 20 4 This expectation continued until the 1990s when his
interests shifted to developing countries and started looking at WTO
from their point of view. 20 5 Even here, Finger started with the
premise that integration into the world economy is a key to
development, and that the WTO provides "a basis for a government
to resist domestic pressures for protection." 206 After a careful review

199. Krueger became the Bank's Vice President for Economics and Research
from 1982 to 1986.
200. See Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 291, 291-303 (1974); Anne 0. Krueger, Evaluating Restrictionist Trade
Regimes: Theory and Measurement, 80 J. POL. ECON. 48 (1972); ANNE 0. KRUEGER,
AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: A TRAGEDY IN THE MAKING (1995).

201. J. Michael Finger, Trade Liberalization: A Public Choice Perspective, in
CHALLENGES TO A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 421, 421-53 (Ryan C.

Amacher, Gottfried Haberler & Thomas D. Willett eds., 1979).
202. J. M. Finger, H. Keith Hall & Douglas R. Nelson, The Political Economy of
Administered Protection,72 AM. ECON. REV. 452 (1982).
203. J. Michael Finger & T. Murray, Policing Unfair Imports: The United States
Example, 24 J.WORLD TRADE 39 (1990).
204. J. Michael Finger, The GATT as an International Discipline over Trade
Restrictions: A Public Choice Perspective, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 125-41 (Roland Vaubel & Thomas D. Willett eds.,
1991).
205. J. Michael Finger & L. Alan Winters, What Can the WTO Do for Developing
Countries, in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 365-97 (Anne 0.
Krueger ed., 1998).
206. Id. at 366.
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of the WTO negotiations on tariff reductions, the WTO rules, and
the WTO special and differential treatment to the developing
A major
countries, Finger's conclusion was a mixed one.
disappointment was that the protectionist measures were retained
even though they did not make sense from an economics point of
view. 207
Shortly after, Finger took on the question of
implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments, frequently
208
using agriculture as an example.
By mercantilist economics, the North-South bargain of
agriculture, textiles and clothing for new areas, might have turned
out to be a fair bargain, export dollar for export dollar. By real
economics it had no chance to turn out fair. What the North gave
up was, in real economics, of benefit to the North as well as to the
South. This is the familiar GATT politics of using an international
commitment to achieve useful but politically unpopular domestic
reforms. What the South gave up was a benefit to the North but
209
in many cases a cost to the South.
He was moving close to the Third World approach in pointing
out that: "[t]his is the politics of imperialism, of extracting from a
210
less powerful party."
Finger's views are not accidental. In 1998, the World Bank
started a research and capacity-building project, initially for the
purpose of providing practical training and assistance to developing
countries in trade policy. In addition to the World Bank's own
analysts, the project also involved a wide range of analysts
associated with research institutes and networks in developing
countries. 211 The result of the project is that some of the World Bank
207. Id. at 379.
208. J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round
Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 WORLD ECON. 511 (2000); J. Michael
Finger & Julio J. Nogu~s, The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in
Future WTO Negotiations, 25 WORLD ECON. 321 (2002); J. Michael Finger, A
Diplomat's Economics: Reciprocity in the Uruguay Round Negotiations,4 WORLD TRADE
REV. 27 (2005); J. Michael Finger, Developing Countries in the WTO System: Applying
Robert Hudec's Analysis to the Doha Round, 31 WORLD ECON. 887 (2008).
209. J. Michael Finger & Julio J. Nogu~s, The UnbalancedUruguay Round Outcome:
The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations: The New Areas in Future WTO
Negotiations, 25 WORLD ECON. 321, 337 (2002).
210. Id.
211. Thomas W. Hertel, Bernard M. Hoekman & Will Martin, Developing
Countries and a New Round of WTO Negotiations,17 WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER
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analysts gradually developed a developing country perspective. In
212
addition to Finger, this group also included Bernard M. Hoekman,
213
Thomas W. Hertel, Richard Blackhurst, Ademola
Will Martin,
Oyejide and Kym Anderson. Hoekman, Blackhurst and Anderson
had strong background in public-choice theory earlier in their
academic careers. 214 Now, like Finger, they used the public-choice
theory to analyze the unbalanced Uruguay Round from developing
country perspective. One of the common areas of interests among
these specialists is agriculture. Hertel and Martin are agricultural
economists with strong preference for free trade. The Global Trade
Analysis Project ("GTAP"), founded by Hertel, provided valuable
data to look at the effects of subsidies from a developed country
perspective. A common policy prescription is that the developed
countries should offer market access to the developing countries.
For example, Kym Anderson noted:
If all those trade-distorting measures were to be removed, the
developing countries' share of global output as of 2015 would rise
from 70 to 75 percent for primary agricultural goods, and from 62
to 65 percent for textiles and clothing. Developing countries' share
of global exports would rise even more dramatically, especially in
agriculture: from 47 to 62 percent in primary & products and from
34 to 40 percent in processed farm products (an increase of two
thirds or around $200 billion per year in 2001 US dollars). Exports
of non-agricultural goods would rise by $400 billion per year. This
amounts to more than six times what was needed to service the
foreign debt of all developing countries in 2003, and to eight times
their receipts of official development assistance. Cotton exports
alone would rise by more than $4 billion for developing countries
as a whole, almost half of which would be enjoyed by Sub215
Saharan Africa.

113, 113-40 (2002).
212. Now Research Manager of the International Trade group in the
Development Research Group of the World Bank.
213. Lead Economist with the World Bank's Trade and Development Research
Group.
214. Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Environmental Policy Formation in
a Trading Economy: A Public Choice Perspective, in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE
ISSUES 221 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992); Kym Anderson &
Richard Blackhurst, Trade, and Environment and Public Policy, in THE GREENING OF
WORLD TRADE ISSUES 1 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992).
215. Kym Anderson, Will Martin, Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Impact of
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D. UnderstandingCommunicative Impasse
The World Bank project is perhaps the most interesting
challenge to the WTO today. This is because the specialists on the
staff of the Bank share a lot of common ground with their
counterparts in the WTO. Specifically, they share policy preference
for free trade, and they share the analytic tool of public-choice
economics. A critical difference, however, is that the specialists at
the World Bank are willing to apply the "capture" claim to the WTO
itself. This is achieved not by any twist in logic, as the "capture"
theory itself does not have any inherent prescription to suggest
where "capture" stops. 216 In a sense, the World Bank project is an
even more faithful application of that logic.
In many aspects, the World Bank project also validates the
general feelings of the developing countries that have long protested
that the developed countries in the current structure of the WTO
treat them unfairly. The differences lie in the approach: The World
Bank specialists work with statistics and data, they make sense of
global trade through models and trends in abstract fashion. In
contrast, developing country trade diplomats learn about global
trade in conference rooms and at negotiation tables, often with more
concrete and personal memory. However, they do share a faith in
the market, a belief that when free market is allowed to work, trade
will bring prosperity to the developing countries, just as it does in
the developed world.
There are fundamental differences between the World Bank
project and the TWAIL in terms of philosophical orientations and
policy preferences. For example, the TWAIL does not share the
notion of market presumed by the World Bank project, and thus
would not agree with them on an unqualified critique of
"distortion" of the market. Yet, despite those differences, the World
Bank project echoes some of the general views of the TWAIL.
Specifically, a key common ground is reciprocity in trade and the
Global Trade and Subsidy Policies on Developing Country Trade, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 945
(2006); Kym Anderson, Trade Liberalization, Agriculture, and Poverty in Low-income
Countries, in THE WTO, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR TRADE-LED GROWTH 37-62 (Basudeb GuhaKhasnobis ed., 2004).
216. Similarly, Dani Rodrik has argued effectively that "[n]eo-classical economic
analysis does not determine the form that institutional arrangements should or do
take." DANI RODRIK, supra note 22, at 29.
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notion of fairness based on that reciprocity. While breach of
reciprocity in trade reminds the TWAIL lawyers of the colonial past,
the same breach constitutes an unprincipled departure from the
economic gospel for the Bank.
If there is a common theme that can link the World Bank
project, the developing countries' real world experience, and the
TWAIL, while also setting them apart from the WTO orthodoxy, it
would be the claims of "capture" that are readily applied to the
WTO as an institution. For the World Bank project, "capture" is a
natural extension of public-choice economics; for the developing
countries, it is the real world experience that speaks louder than any
abstract theory; for the TWAIL, it is only a small step from the
Marxian notion of "class." Since "public-choice" theory does not
offer any inherent limit as to how far the "capture" claim goes, each
of the three rival perspectives is as logically sound as the WTO
orthodoxy. What separates them is pre-existing policy preferences.
Because of this, the common language not only fails to channel any
communication; but also, ironically perhaps, keeps them divided.
The July 2008 breakdown of Doha Round talks is a good reminder.
For the WTO orthodoxy, its pre-existing policy preference is to
politically defend the institution, and its basic strategy for that
defense is refusal to communicate in substance with its rival
theories.
Shortly before the July 2008 breakdown, Peter D.
Sutherland commented on developing countries: "All too often,
many developing countries measure their success in the WTO's
Doha Round of trade negotiations by the extent to which they avoid
obligations to open up their economies." 217 Jagdish Bhagwati's
reflection after Seattle seems to be more focused on attacking the
developing countries and anti-globalization groups. For Bhagwati,
the Seattle debacle was between the anti-globalization protestors in
developed countries and the developing countries. 218 Bhagwati
accused critiques of the WTO from developing countries as
"hypocrisy" and "ill-advised" rhetoric which would do more harm
than good. 219 He insisted that the developing countries were to be
217. Peter D. Sutherland, Transforming Nations: How the WTO Boosts Economies
and Opens Societies, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 125, 125 (2008).
218. See Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the IATO, 77 INT'L AFFAIRS
15 (2001).
219. Jagdish Bhagwati, Trading for Development: How to Assist Poor Countries, in
DOHA AND BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 115, 121
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blamed for practicing protectionism by maintaining higher tariff
rates. He and his collaborator use India (and China) as a "salutary"
example of embracing globalization without feeling any necessity to
explain the widespread discontent. 220
Similarly, John H. Jackson continues his attack on sovereignty
as an outdated concept, and refers to criticism of the WTO and
globalization as "hypocrisy" and "thought-destructive mantras." 221
He calls for a "pragmatic functionalism," so that globalization can
be understood as "allocation of power as between different levels of
governance entities in the world." 222 One must "break down the
complex array of 'sovereignty' concepts and examine particular
aspects in detail and with precision to understand what is actually
at play."223 For Jackson, the "core problem" is that globalization
creates a demand for an "appropriate international institutions";
once the outdated notion of sovereignty has been deconstructed,
one should wholeheartedly welcome the WTO as "essentially an
international economic regulatory level of government." 224
From the Third World point of view, Jackson's position does not
address any of their concerns. For trade officials like Kamal Nath,
the Minister of Commerce and Industries of India, Jackson's
message is an empty preaching of faith without offering any reason
based in real life. A real free-trade believer, like those involved in
the World Bank project, would perhaps like to remind Jackson of his
own earlier writings and ask him to apply those critical insights on
the WTO itself. Jackson may have some common ground with a
TWAIL lawyer in the critique of the political apparatus of the
modern State. After all, B. S. Chimni calls for caution when he says:
"in the era of globalization, the ruling elite in the third world is
coming to be an integral part of an emerging transnational ruling
elite that seeks to establish the global rule of transnational capital on
the pretext of pursuing 'national interests."' 225 But then Jackson has
(Mike Moore ed., 2004).
220. Jagdish Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, Trade and Poverty in the Poor Countries,
92 AM. ECON. REV. 180, 182 (2002).
221. John H. Jackson, Sovereign-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 800 (2003) [hereinafter John H. Jackson, Sovereign-Modern].
222. Id. at 801.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 799.
225. Chirni, Manifesto, supra note 158, at 51.

20091

Divided by Common Language

very little to offer when Chimni advocates democratization of the
WTO process.
From social discourse point of view, the unwillingness to
engage in a genuine dialogue with the developing countries makes
"capture" claims a language game, not a real conversation. Rush
Rhees, one of Wittgenstein's colleagues and friends, highlighted the
differences between a language game and conversation: "Nothing
,emerges' in the course of the game - unless it is the skill or
ineptitude of the players." Therefore, Rhees concluded, "taking part
in a game is not like taking part in a discussion." 226 That difference
probably explains the frustration shared by trade officials in
developing countries, the TWAIL lawyers, and those World Bank
economists, discussed in this article. To insist otherwise, is perhaps
the kind of "bewitchment of our intelligence by means of
language." 227
IV. Conclusion
The July 2008 collapse of the Doha Round trade talkw is a
symptom of a much deeper crisis in the WTO. If, by launching the
Doha Round in 2001, the WTO was correct in recognizing the
importance of trade and development, it has not been able to fulfill
any promise so far. Developing countries today are not merely on
the periphery of the global market; rather, they are the majority in
number. They could, as they have since 1999, block any further
progression in trade talks when their questions are not addressed.
In the wake of such communicative impasse, the orthodox WTO
"capture" theorists are facing a dilemma: if they choose to continue
their logical "rigor," there is no reason that the same logic cannot
apply to the WTO itself. Or, if they choose their policy preference
by brushing aside challenges, then they are losing the theoretical
foundation of their institution.
In the second scenario, the
institution becomes an instrument of power and domination exactly what the architects of GATT strived to prevent.
In the United States, there are at least two responses to the
stalemate in the WTO: One is to withdraw from the multilateral

226. RUSH RHEEs, WITrGENSTEIN AND THE POSSIBILrrY OF DISCOURSE 107 (D. Z.
Phillips ed., 1998).
227. "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language." LUDWIG WrTrGENSTEIN, supra note 21, Part I, §109, at 40(e).
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system, and the other is to link reform of the welfare state with that
of the WTO. In his comment on the collapse of the recent WTO trade
talks, columnist David Brooks represents the first response in his
nostalgia of the "good old days" when the United States economy
dominated world trade. 228 Thus he expressed some unease with the
multi-polar world in which big developing countries like India,
Brazil and China are sharing the power: "multi-polarity means that
more groups have effective veto power over collective action. In
practice, this new pluralistic world has given rise to globosclerosis,
an inability to solve problem after problem." 229 As he continued the
analysis, Brooks came to something that sounds familiar: "Groups
with a strong narrow interest are able to block larger groups with a
diffuse but generalized interest." 230 Is there any way out? Brooks
believes that "[t]he best idea floating around now is a League of
Democracies, as [Senator] John McCain and several Democrats have
proposed. Nations with similar forms of government do seem to
231
share cohering values."
Brooks' comment is both puzzling and revealing. It is revealing
because his comments show how quickly he links trade negotiations
with "forms of government." Thus, he manages to channel his
frustration with the Doha trade talks at other allegedly
"nondemocratic" players in the game. It is puzzling, as he seems to
imply somehow that Brazil and India are not democracies. He
seems unaware that, in agriculture trade policy, the United States
does not have an easier relationship with the European Union or
Japan - who both may qualify as "nations with similar forms of
government."
Brooks' solution is a possibility that none of the groups
discussed in this article, including the WTO hardcore defenders,
would want to see. After all, Sutherland asserts himself as a
"cosmopolitan" 232; and Mike Moore labels himself as a "social
democrat" with a strong faith in internationalism. 233 In the
Sutherland Report, they explicitly addressed the concerns of

228. David Brooks, Missing Dean Acheson, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 2008, at A19.
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proliferation of bilateral and regional arrangements in the new
millennium. 234 The other three rival groups - the TWAIL lawyers,
the developing countries trade officials, and some of those World
Bank economists - share a common policy preference in trade.
An alternative response is to start a genuine dialogue about
trade and development of the Third World, as well as the meanings
of the "welfare state." In the United States, the European Union,
and Japan, agricultural subsidies started as welfare programs, 235 but
have grown enormously in number and distorted the global
agricultural market. For instance, the United States Farm Bill of
2008, passed in a year with near-record commodity prices, is a more
recent example of how much this policy has been entrenched in
domestic politics. 23 6 President Barak Obama has pledged to cut
237
subsidies to big farms, but that position is facing challenges.
Reform is not an easy task in the European Union either.238 The
entrenchment is not new; it has been the main theme for all
"capture" theories, from the times of J. A. Hobson, Thorstein
Veblen, and Richard T. Ely. During this period, protective tariffs,
instead of agricultural subsidy, was the main subject matter of
analysis. Richard T. Ely, who founded the American Economic
Association, commented in 1888 that "The moment a tax is placed
234. SUTHERLAND, The Future of the WVTO, supra note 186, at 19-27 (discussing
proliferation of regional trade agreements, the so-called "spaghetti bow"). For a
critique of the Report, see Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed
Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the I/TO, 8 J.
INT'L ECON.
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on imported goods, that moment those engaged in its production at
home have an interest in the control of legislation to suit their
private ends. It is unavoidable. The temptation to do wrong is
absolutely inseparable from protectionism." 239 One key difference,
however, between Ely's view and the conventional wisdom of today
is that the progressives of Ely's time viewed free trade policy as not
only compatible with welfare state agenda at home, but also as a
tool to facilitate it. If this line of thinking is followed, then the Third
World's "capture" critiques can be consistent with liberal reform of
the welfare state in the United States. There are at least two
common interests between the Third World and the welfare state:
(a) reduction of agricultural subsidies will relieve Welfare State of its
fiscal burden and in the meantime, make room for the Third World
to increase their exports and market share; and (b) the Welfare State
can have more funds invested in environment technology and hence
provide leadership on issues like climate change. If and when such
a dialogue occurs, "capture" would become a common language
that can bring the global community together.
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